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No. 303: High School Series, No. 7

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A COURSE IN MORAL INSTRUCTION
FOR THE HIGH SCHOOL

BY

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP

Professor of Philosophy

University of Wisconsin

MADISON

Published by the University

June, 1909

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7. *A COURSE IN MORAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE HIGH SCHOOL*, by Frank Chapman Sharp, Professor of Philosophy. 1900.

Entered as second-class matter June 30, 1894, at the post office at Madison, Wisconsin, under the Act of July 23, 1911.

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
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INTRODUCTION

This manual is intended to supply material for a year's course in moral instruction in the high school. It is planned with reference to the interests, needs, and intellectual status of the members of the junior and senior classes, particularly the latter. Its appeal is directed, furthermore, to the more thoughtful members of these classes. The course will undoubtedly be given as an elective; presumably also (though I hope not) without credit. In any event, it will be something outside of the ordinary routine. Under these circumstances, it was possible to consider in its preparation solely the question of the condition of its greatest usefulness rather than that of widest popularity. There will accordingly be found here nothing but materials which may supply a basis for serious work. At the same time, as I believe, this demand for work will be no bar to popularity among the more earnest students, who alone will profit from any course of this kind, however planned.

The principal aim of the course is to develop a habit of thoughtfulness about the problems of daily conduct. It is true of most of us, young and old alike, that in our preoccupation with the means we forget all about reflecting on the value of ends. It was so in the Greece of Socrates; it is so all over the world today. The American in particular, like Huxley's horse-back rider, doesn't know where he is going, but he is going at a terrible pace. Moreover, our vision is so narrow that the indirect effects of our actions for the most part escape our attention. The first object of this course, then, is to train young people to scrutinize ends as well as means, and to learn to trace the indirect effects of their actions upon the welfare, including the character, of all those affected, both self and others. The outcome should be some rudiments, at least, of wisdom, in the sense of a knowledge of how to live, the wisdom which, as far as anything now done by our schools is concerned, lingers, while mere knowledge comes in abundance. Such wisdom may unquestionably influence life, and influence it profoundly. If the teacher can make his pupils feel that he believes there is some better way of going through life than

jumping blindly at every piece of bait laid in the way, if he can convince them that he is deeply interested in their genuine welfare and believes it to be something well worth working for, and, above all, if he can prove by his life his confidence in the truth of the principles which he teaches, he will arouse in better natures an enthusiasm, deep and permanent, for the ideal of life presented, and a willingness or even eagerness to adopt the means necessary for its realization, however laborious or otherwise forbidding these may be.

The subject of this course is success in life. The reason for selecting it out of a number of other possibilities is obvious. Of all subjects dealing with the conduct of life, it is the best adapted to catch and hold the attention of the boy or girl just about to go out into the world. The program is divided into two parts. The first deals with the means to success; the second with the nature of genuine success. In the first part the meaning of the word success is purposely left undefined. The pupil will more or less explicitly define it for himself according to his own character and tastes. As long as he is studying Part I his ideals, however crude, should under no circumstances be disturbed. For here we are dealing with powers, and capacities, and modes of action, equally necessary for the attainment of all ideals. And his interest in them would fade if he ceased to see them as means to the realization of what directly appealed to him as worth striving for. In Part II, the nature of true success is investigated. Here again no formal definition is attempted. The work is confined to scrutinizing the claims of various elements to a place in the really successful life. The goal of endeavor is spoken of indiscriminately as the successful life and the happy life. Students of ethics—should this manual fall into the hands of any members of that guild—must understand that the word happy is here used not in the narrow sense attached to it by this school or that, but as the equivalent of the Greek eudaimon, that which makes life really worth living.

This course is presented as a course in moral instruction because of the belief that, in the first place, the fundamental duty of every man is to seek to make his own life a genuinely successful one; and, in the second place, that, for the most part (on *any* view of human welfare) the path of the highest

success and of the strictest duty are identical. If the high schools are ever able to introduce moral instruction into every one of the four years at their disposal, this course might well be preceded by one dealing with our duties as such, exhibiting the kinds of action they call for, and still more, the nature of their claims to our allegiance. But where a school is shut up to a single year's work in this department, I believe the subject of success offers better opportunities for the effective exercise of moral influence by the teacher than does a course on duty as such, because of the superior initial interest to which it ministers.

As soon as the purposes of the course are grasped in their entirety it will be obvious why we begin with the study of psychological problems. As those who wish well to their pupils, our aim should be to build up not merely character, but rather a well-rounded personality. The first problem that naturally arises in such an endeavor is the conditions of intellectual efficiency. This is reason enough. But there is a subsidiary and yet important one. It is necessary that the student should discover at the very outset that he is not going to be made a target for sermons, but rather that he is to be guided by a sympathetic friend to the discovery of that which he really wants to know. He will have no difficulty in seeing the "practical" value of the work in psychology and thus his confidence in what lies beyond will be strengthened.

As the teacher works through the program, he will find omissions, some of which will doubtless strike him as of a very serious nature. Those which I myself most lament are in the second part. A course of this kind should unquestionably contain a discussion of the following topics: the love of beauty and of knowledge; the enthusiasm for moral ideals, which includes the spirit leading to what Paley calls "acts of bounty and beneficence," and what Paley ignores throughout his entire book, the aspiration for perfection of character; religious ideals; and finally wealth,—I say finally because the place in life of that which is only a means can hardly be determined till after a complete survey of the ends to which it may minister. I will only say with regard to these and certain other omissions which I regret, that some limits had to be set to the size of a manual which must, in part at least, awaken the in-

terest which it attempts to satisfy; and that there is nothing in its present form which precludes the further development of the object at some future time.

To the teacher, however, who feels the necessity of discussing the above enumerated topics, I can at least give a suggestion or two about the appropriate literature. As a basis for the study of the aesthetic and intellectual interests I recommend Hamerton's beautiful book—one of the best works on the conduct of life written in the Nineteenth Century—*The Intellectual Life* (Roberts Bros., Boston). For the second topic, I am unable to suggest anything better than Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*, (in his *Characteristics*) Book II. It will be found in Volume I of Selby-Bigge's *British Moralists* (a collection of selections). This book is published in two volumes by the Oxford University Press at a price of \$2.25 per volume. For the third, there is Hilty's *Happiness* (translated into English by Professor F. G. Peabody, and published by the Macmillan Co.). This is a very impressive presentation of the subject, though the author's criticism of other ideals of life than the religious is marred, in my opinion, by the assumption that the imperfect is worthless. Finally, excellent material for a study of the relation of wealth to happiness is supplied by an essay of Ex-president Eliot's, entitled *Great Riches*. This first appeared in *The World's Work* for April, 1906, and was subsequently republished separately by Crowell of New York (75 cents). Another valuable discussion of this subject, of an entirely different nature, of course, is Emerson's essay, *Wealth*, in *The Conduct of Life*.

There remain to be considered the methods to be used in conducting the course. The fundamental principle upon which all technique must be based in a subject of this kind is that only those results have value which are obtained by the pupil through his own activity. In this field our own assertions or those of the authors we cite will, by themselves, commonly fail to produce conviction. In the first place, we are hired by the community to be teachers, so that our motives for recommending this or that course of life may be regarded as not above suspicion. In the second place, the world we live in, as adults, especially as adults who are not openly seeking great riches, is a place very foreign to our pupils, and the

reports we bring of it are like the tales told by travellers returning from some far distant country,—one does not know whether to believe them, and what he does believe means very little to him. Accordingly the method employed as far as practicable is to say to the pupil, Examine for yourself. Hence the majority of the topics are dealt with by means of questions, the answers of which are to be worked out by the students themselves. It is intended that these questions, together with—in Part II—the material upon which they are based, shall be mimeographed and put into the hands of the class. This should always be done in advance of the consideration of the topic in the recitation period. If the cost of mimeographing is shared by all the class, the total expense per person will be much less than that of the ordinary text-book. The material in the notes for the teacher represents what, in my opinion, should be the outcome of the discussion of the pupils' answers, together with the teacher's share (or rather, it is to be hoped, a part of the teacher's share) of the illustrative and explanatory material that may be contributed.

Where the above described method can not well be employed, the device recommended to force the students to activity is the writing and reading of abstracts of assigned references. One pupil, at least, should read his abstract to the class; then the teacher may read one which he himself has prepared from the same material. Several things will be accomplished by this procedure. The class is supplied expeditiously with material for discussion. At the same time the writers of the abstract are getting very valuable training in a field where most students are woefully deficient, the power to read an article or a chapter in a book and grasp the essential points in their logical relation to each other. Furthermore, as soon as the student discovers that neglected and important powers are being developed by his work, he will pursue it with an increased ardor. The reading of the paper will be followed by a full and free discussion of the subject on the part of the class, in which the teacher plays the role of presiding officer and judge, and occasionally, as necessity arises, of critic and purveyor of information. It will give body to the discussion if all the members of the class read in advance the article of which an abstract is presented.

As material for such work, the following should be well within the powers of high school seniors: all the chapters referred to in Halleck's *Psychology and Psychic Culture* and in MacCunn's, *The Making of Character*; James on *Habit* (at least as presented in the *Psychology for Teachers*), and possibly some parts of the treatment of memory in his *Principles*; the articles in the magazines on the relation of integrity and of kindness and generosity to success. The few topics which are not provided for by one or the other of these methods will, I suppose, have to be presented to the class in lecture form. Or perhaps it would be better to have them mimeographed and placed in the hands of the students to be used as a basis, not of recitation, but of class discussion.

The last few minutes of every period, whatever the exact nature of the method pursued, should be devoted to summarizing the conclusions reached and restating and regrouping the more important illustrative and explanatory material whether contributed by students or teacher. These may perhaps be formulated by the teacher, or some student, in the smallest possible compass and copied by the pupils into a note book. Whether they should then be memorized is a question for experience to determine.

Perhaps I may be allowed to add, in conclusion, that this course is not a wholly untried experiment. Portions of it are being given in three prominent high schools of the state of Wisconsin in this (the second) semester of the academic year 1908-09. At Menomonie the class is divided into three sections which are being taught by Mr. G. A. Works, the principal, Mrs. Mary Bradford, and Miss Daisy Allen. These teachers have met several times during the semester and compared notes, and have sent me the resulting suggestions and criticisms. These suggestions have proved to be of the utmost value and I hereby express my grateful acknowledgment of them.

Since the course is admittedly an experiment, I should feel very grateful if those who attempt to give it would follow generally the example of the Menomonie teachers and give me the benefit of their experience. Baedeker's guide books are declared to owe their present excellence in no small part to the information and suggestions supplied by the travellers who

have used them. If, similarly, the—I will not say travellers, but rather explorers, in this darkest of pedagogical continents, will give the author the benefit of their experience in wandering with his guide-book in hand, it may shorten and smooth the way for those who follow them.

PART I.

THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS

CHAPTER I—THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MIND

ATTENTION

Questions for the Class

1. When there is a clock ticking or striking in the room does a person always hear it? May an object be "right in front of your eyes," and you not see it? May an object be pressing against the skin without your feeling it? 2. What conclusion is to be drawn from the answers to the preceding questions? 3. When you do see an object, do you necessarily see all parts of it with equal clearness and distinctness? In order to answer this question fix your eyes steadily upon some word near the center of a printed page and note carefully what you see. In listening to four part singing do you hear all parts with equal clearness and distinctness? 4. Is the difference between a good and a poor observer merely this that the one has better eyes or ears or other sense organs than the other? 5. Why is it that of two people with equally good memory, one can afterwards describe in detail what was in a room in which he has spent only a few moments, what kind of clothes a person had on, how a flower or bird, new to him, looked, whereas the other cannot do it at all? 6. If gaining a valuable prize depended upon your being able to give an accurate and complete description of a stuffed bird exposed to your gaze for say twenty seconds, how would you go about to do it? 7. Why is it that an expert roofer can see a hundredfold more of what is happening at a football game than one who is a spectator of the game for the first time? 8. If the former has watched the practice a good deal, will he see more of what his own team does than of what the other team does? 9. A botanist and an ignoramus in botany are each looking at the same flower. Why does the former see more of its qualities and characteristics than the latter? 10. Do we find differences in clearness and distinctness in our thoughts? Give an example. 11. We say of some people's thinking that it has perspective. What does that statement mean? 12. If the thought is at all complex, can a speaker make it clear to his audience (as a lawyer addressing a jury) without perspective in his thinking? 13. In *Talks to*

Teachers, p. 113, Professor James writes: "The possession of a steady faculty of attention is unquestionably a great boon. Those who have it can work more rapidly and with less nervous wear and tear. I am inclined to think that no one who is without it naturally can by any amount of drill or discipline attain it in a very high degree. Its amount is probably a fixed characteristic of the individual." Does the statement of the last two sentences accord with your observation or experience? (As there is no experimental evidence on this subject, one way or the other, everyone is entitled to his own opinion.)

14. To what is mind wandering, e. g., in the classroom, usually due? For instance, under what circumstances do the noises outdoors cease to be noticed? 15. Would a substantial reward to the student who should most effectively absorb himself in his school work for an afternoon (supposing it could be determined who this student was) have any effect in producing sustained concentration of attention. 16. Does the indulgence of our tendency to let our attention be carried away by every passing solicitation strengthen that tendency? 17. What conclusion may we draw from the answers to the preceding questions as to the possibility of developing in ourselves the power of sustained attention? 18. How must we go about it if we wish to gain and keep the attention of others? (Think, for instance, of a salesman dealing with a possible customer, a lawyer addressing a jury.)

Notes for the Teacher

Inattention.—An object acting upon the sense organs may produce (1) no effect whatever in consciousness (total inattention); or (2) a vague and dim representation of itself (partial attention); or (3) a clear and distinct representation (complete attention). Some remarkable examples of (1) will be found in James' *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 419; cf. also James' *Briefer Course*, p. 223. One of the most famous of these is the following: "Archimedes was so absorbed in geometrical meditation that he was first aware of the storming of Syracuse by his own death wound, and his exclamation on the entrance of the Roman soldiers was: 'Do not disturb my circles.'" The often cited cases of soldiers in battle not perceiving that they are wounded, belong here also.

The Distinction Between Focus and Margin of Consciousness.

In every state of consciousness, we can distinguish between the clear and distinct representations of objects, and the vague and dim ones. The former portion of consciousness is called the focus, the latter is called the margin. "Fix your eyes upon any word near the middle of this page; that word is sharp, clear-cut, and well-defined in vision. Other words near it, above, below, as well as on either side, are visible, but not clearly defined. The rest of the page is also visible and probably a good deal more besides, but only dimly and in hazy outlines." Take another illustration from the same author. "If we fix our eyes on any distant object, such as a church spire, this is in the focus of vision; but it is set in the midst of a wide visual field. The focus shades off into and is surrounded by a margin, in which the objects, instead of being clean cut and well defined, like the church spire, are dim and blurred in outline. Although this illustration is based on vision [the author continues], it is applicable to consciousness generally. Those who have an ear for, and some little knowledge of, music, can, when they are listening to a four part song, focus their attention on the alto, tenor, or bass, making that the dominant theme, and allowing the other parts to be marginal." (Morgan, *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, Ch. I).

Exercises to Show the Extent of Inattention and Partial Attention.—[Several of these exercises may seem to be rather exercises of memory than attention. Where, however, an object has been before us hundreds of times, we should have no difficulty in recalling its features if we had observed it with attention.] Have the pupils think of some familiar wall paper pattern and ask them to describe it. Have them give a description of the house next door; of a church or public building which they pass every day. Ask where the ears of a cow are situated in relation to the horns. Write a notice to the class on the board which is misspelled and note how many discover the fact. Bring into class a glass of some ill-tasting liquid. Bid the class observe what you do and themselves do the same thing after you. Dip your index finger into the liquid and then put your *second* finger into your mouth. Most of the class will use the first finger throughout.

The Qualifications of a Good Observer. What are called

high powers of observation consist not necessarily in exceptionally acute sense organs but primarily in the ability or rather the habit of allowing limited portions of the object under examination to enter the focus of consciousness in succession, and of building up in memory, as we proceed, a picture of the most important parts thus discovered, placing them in their proper relation to each other. In the first survey, even for the best endowed observer, the result is a rather vague, blurred picture, but this clears up with repetition, fundamentally as the result of the principle of preperception (James, *Principles*, I, 437 ff.; *Briefer Course*, p. 230, from par. 4, ff.). And when a person is thoroughly familiar with a class of objects or activities, he gets the most important features of a new individual of that class before the mind with extraordinary ease and rapidity. As an example, compare a novice and an expert as spectators of a foot-ball game. See James, *Principles*, II, p. 343; *Briefer Course*, p. 362. See also on this subject Halleck, *Psychology and Psychic Culture*, Ch. IV.

The distinction between focus and margin is found in our thoughts as well as our sensations. If you are reading a novel the meaning of the sentence immediately before the eye will normally be focal; the meaning of the sentences immediately preceding will be present in the mind in vaguer outlines. Further out in the margin will be the main features of the plot of the book, as far as it has thus far revealed itself. If it were not, you could no more understand the bearing of what you were reading, than you could that of a sentence in the middle of a book which you were taking up for the first time. One of the results of the narrowness of the field of thought is the necessity for perspective in thinking, by which is meant the distribution of our attention over the different portions of a whole in strict proportion to their relative importance. The power to do this may be developed most effectively by exercises in writing brief outlines of magazine articles and chapters in books, and submitting them to the criticism of a teacher. One reason why the habit of devouring newspapers and novels in large quantities is fatal to mental efficiency is that in this hasty process little or nothing has time to come into the focus, *i. e.*, to become clear. The habit thereby set up tends to extend to everything else.

The Power of Concentrating and Sustaining the Attention.—The statement that the amount of attention is probably a fixed characteristic of the individual may be doubted. Mind-wandering is often due to the fact that it is disagreeable to concentrate on what is intrinsically uninteresting, or hard to curb our curiosity as to what is going on around us. But we can habituate ourselves to the disagreeable till it ceases to be disagreeable just as well in this field as in any other; and we can kill this butterfly curiosity by refusing to feed it, as we can any other emotion. Certain differences between individuals will doubtless remain till the end, but they can probably be reduced to a minimum. James himself recognizes that attention to particular things can be strengthened indirectly in several ways. See *Principles*, I, 446-7; *Briefer Course*, 236. In *Principles*, I, 423-4, *Briefer Course*, 227, is shown the relation between attention and interest. Attention is, broadly speaking, a function of interest, whether immediate (for its own sake), or derived (as a means to some immediately interesting end). Accordingly whatever can be done to strengthen the interest in a subject will lead to concentrated and sustained attention. In a general way interest depends upon the existence of a certain amount of novelty. But some familiarity is necessary, too, for that which has no point of contact with our past experience or with previous knowledge is not apt to interest. The missionary who was exhibiting to his semi-civilized people a phonograph just imported, could elicit no interest in it whatever till finally he suggested to one of them to talk into it. Then they woke up. "What!" they said, "this thing hasn't been with us a week and already speaks our language!" That phenomenon had some relation to their past observations. The dullness of the first chapter of a novel often has a similar basis; we do not yet know enough about the characters to be particularly interested in what they are doing or saying. The application of this principle to our own life is that the want of an interest in many subjects, with the consequent inability to hold our attention upon them, may be due not to innate poverty of mind, but to the want of sufficient perseverance to secure for ourselves the requisite preliminary familiarity. This is especially important to remember in at-

tempting to develop a taste for subjects which appeal either to the pure love of knowledge for its own sake, or to the love of the beautiful.

As to the importance of this power of sustained attention there can hardly be any fundamental difference of opinion. The Scotch philosopher and psychologist, Sir William Hamilton, writes: "The difference between an ordinary mind and the mind of Newton consists principally in this, that the one is capable of a more continuous attention than the other, that a Newton is able, without fatigue, to connect inference with inference in one long series toward a determined end; while the man of inferior capacity is soon obliged to break or let fall the thread which he has begun to spin." Hamilton indeed seems to suppose that an initial gift of sustained attention makes a genius of one who would otherwise be an ordinary person. Professor James, on the other hand, in a passage already referred to, points to the true relation. It is richness of ideas that ordinarily produces the attention, rather than the reverse. But there is no doubt that two people alike in richness of ideas may have different powers of attention, depending upon the extent to which counter-attractions are allowed to act upon them, and that, of these two, the man with the more perfectly sustained attention will do far more effective work. Since attention, as we have seen, is dependent upon interest, there is a large element of truth in Robert Louis Stevenson's definition of genius as a certain ardor of the soul.

As between immediate and derived interest, the former is the only thing that can be depended upon to sustain attention continuously for more than a few seconds. After that the thought of the reward or penalty or of whatever is sustaining the attention usually drops from the mind. If during that time the subject itself has not seized hold upon the attention as the result of its own inherent attractiveness, the mind will thereupon promptly wander from the topic. Accordingly a money prize for sustained attention will produce results of only moderate value except where the subject is able to call forth some interest for its own sake. Under such circumstances, the prize may give the initial impulse or impulses which would otherwise be wanting.

The Control of the Attention of Others. One of the most important "secrets of success" in many lines of work is the ability to gain and hold the attention of others. To do this you must of course appeal to already existing interests. These interests, in their turn, will be attached to pre-existing ideas of some sort in the man's mind. This is vague in the last degree. But vague and commonplace, too, though it be, it is constantly ignored by teachers, by lawyers addressing a jury, by clergymen, and often even by salesmen in addressing themselves to their hearers, without having discovered whether the circle of ideas upon which their appeal is based is familiar to their hearers or not. Interest in a subject can not be aroused except as something is already known about it. Therefore if the subject is quite new, its relation to some other one already familiar to the auditor, must be pointed out at the very outset.

IMAGES

When a sensation has been experienced, a copy of it may arise in the mind after the original outward stimulus is gone and the sensation has disappeared. This copy is called an image. For example, close your eyes and try to call up the appearance of your room. If you succeed in any degree, the result is an image. Or try to recall the sound of a friend's voice, the taste of olives, the odor of a rose, the feeling of a stone in your hand, the feeling of moving one of your fingers when you actually do not move it. The sound that you hear, as a result, the taste, or odor, etc., that arises is an image of the corresponding sensation.

The class must first of all discover for themselves the differences between persons in the power of imaging. This can be done by getting them to answer the questions of Sir Francis Galton, the pioneer in this field. They will be found in his *Inquiry into Human Faculty*, Appendix E. They are (with a few omissions of matters irrelevant to our immediate purpose) as follows. The question begins with his preliminary directions. The words in square brackets are additions of my own.

"Before addressing yourself to any of the questions that follow, think of some definite object—suppose it is your breakfast-table as you sat down to it this morning—and consider carefully the picture that rises before your mind's eye.

1. *Illumination*.—Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is its brightness comparable to that of the actual scene?

2. *Definition*.—Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same time, or is the place of sharpest definition at any one moment more contracted than it is in the real scene?

3. *Coloring*.—Are the colors of the china, of the toast, bread crust, mustard, meat, parsley, or whatever may have been on the table, quite distinct and natural?

4. *Distance of Images*.—Where do mental images appear to be situated? Within the head, within the eye-ball, just in front of the eyes, or at a distance corresponding to reality?

5. *Command over Images*.—Can you retain a mental picture steadily before the eyes? When you do so, does it grow brighter or dimmer?

6. *Persons*.—Can you recall with distinctness the features of all near relations and many other persons? Can you at will cause your mental image of any or most of them to sit, stand, or turn slowly round? Can you deliberately seat the image of a well-known person in a chair and see it with enough distinctness to enable you to sketch it leisurely (supposing yourself able to draw)?

7. *Scenery*.—Do you preserve the recollection of scenery with much precision of detail, and do you find pleasure in dwelling on it? Can you easily form mental pictures from the descriptions of scenery that are so frequently met with in novels and books of travel?

8. *Comparison with Reality*.—What difference do you perceive between a very vivid mental picture called up in the dark, and a real scene? Have you ever mistaken a mental image for a reality when in health and wide awake?

9. Call up before your imagination the objects specified in the six following paragraphs, numbered A to F, and consider carefully whether your mental representation of them generally, is in each group very faint, faint, fair, good, or vivid and comparable to the actual sensation:

A. *Light and Color*.—An evenly clouded sky (omitting all landscape), first bright, then gloomy. A thick, surrounding haze, first white, then successively blue, yellow, green, and red.

B. *Sound*.—The beat of rain against the window panes, the crack of a whip, a church bell, the hum of bees, the whistle

of a railway, the clinking of tea-spoons and saucers, the slam of a door.

C. *Smells*.—Tar, roses, an oil-lamp blown out, hay, violets, a fur coat, gas, tobacco.

D. *Tastes*.—Salt, sugar, lemon juice, raisins, chocolate, currant jelly.

E. *Touch*.—Velvet, silk, soap, gum, sand, dough, a crisp dead leaf, the prick of a pin.

F. *Other Sensations*.—Heat, hunger, cold, thirst, fatigue, fever, drowsiness, a bad cold, [extending and bending the index finger, raising the foot from the floor].

10. *Music*.—Have you any aptitude for mentally recalling music, or for imagining it? [Do not confuse images of the sounds that you would produce in singing a song with images of the sensations in tongue, lips, throat, etc., produced by the movements involved in singing].

11. *At Different Ages*.—Do you recollect what your powers of visualizing, etc., were in childhood? Have they varied much within your recollection?"

For an account of the results obtained by Galton himself, see, if accessible, his *Inquiry into Human Faculty*, the chapter on *Mental Imagery* (This book is now published in Everyman's Library by E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y., and may be had for 35 cents). Another account, in part quoted from Galton, will be found in James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 50-68; also *Briefer Course*, pp. 303-310.

The practical problem is, can we improve our powers of imaging? If so, no argument is needed to show the new sources of pleasure that would thereby be opened to those in whom these powers are rudimentary. In many cases, it would mean a great increase in efficiency also. The picture framer, the paper hanger, and the dressmaker, can hardly succeed without some degree of the visualizing power. Still more is this true of the geologist, the engineer, the inventor, the designer, the architect, the painter, and, indeed, a number of other important professions, and occupations that rank with the professions. There is, however, no conclusive evidence that this can be done. Meyer, in James' *Principles*, Vol. II, pp. 66-68, indeed, asserts that he improved markedly his powers of visual imagery by practice. Galton, *Inquiry into*

Human Faculty (Everyman Edition, p. 73), makes statements to the same effect (cf. Halleck *op. cit.*, p. 134). Others, however, have not been so successful. Unfortunately no careful work has been done on the subject. There are probably individual differences in this matter, and age presumably makes a great deal of difference. At all events the teacher should urge his pupils to try the experiments described by Meyer or by Galton. On the general subject of the cultivation of imagery see Halleck, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-179.

MEMORY

Remembering involves the recall of a former experience or of some item of past knowledge that had in the meantime dropped from the mind. Recall takes place as a result of the workings of the laws of association. The fundamental law governing association is called the law of contiguity. It may be stated thus: Objects or qualities of objects that have been experienced together or in immediate succession tend to call each other up, so that when one is again experienced or thought of, the others will be thought of also. It is a corollary of the preceding that we have, not a single memory, but a vast number of memories. See James, *Principles*, Vol. II, pp. 684-5.

The Improvement of the Memory.—James denies that one's general native retentiveness can be improved by memory exercises such as learning poetry or lists of words; see *Principles*, Vol. I, 663 ff.; *Briefer Course*, 296 ff. This position cannot be maintained, at least in this extreme form, in view of recent careful experiments. See W. D. Pillsbury in the *Educational Review* for June, 1908, pp. 15-27. Nevertheless, James is probably nearer right in this matter than the average person would suppose. In any event, his discussion of how to improve the memory is of great value. See *Principles*, Vol. I, 659-663, 667-9; *Briefer Course*, 292-296, and 298-299. For the influence of health upon memory, see Halleck, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

The Competition of Divergent Associations.—Almost every object or quality has been experienced with a number of other objects or qualities. Which of these will be called up in any given instance? Some of the most important conditions which determine what shall come up will be found in James, *Principles*, Vol. I, pp. 574-577, *Briefer Course*, 264-267. The im-

portance of frequency of repetition is known to everyone. A less well-known fact, however, which has been established by experiments is this: Repetitions immediately following each other yield less enduring associations than those which are separated by considerable intervals of time. In learning a series of nonsense syllables, for example, associations are less firmly established by twenty-four consecutive repetitions than by four repetitions a day continued for six days. This division again yields a less favorable result than two repetitions a day continued for twelve days. Recency (in James's list) requires no explanation beyond that given in the book. Vividness means the amount of attention given to the object. Emotional congruity represents an often ignored fact of great importance. From it follows the fact that deep and broad interests are a help to memory (and to the constructive imagination also). This is true of *any* emotion. When we are angry we can think of splendid things to say against the person who has wronged us; our ideas flow easily and abundantly. But this heightening of the power is all in one direction, whence arises a most serious danger. The presence of a strong emotion tends to blind us to everything that does not fit in with it. Hence the pessimist by temperament sees nothing but sorrow in the world and failure in his own enterprises (Edwin Booth); the timid always "see a lion in the path," etc. Everyone must be on the watch for the constant bias of his own temperament and for the conclusions he forms when under the influence of any strong emotion. For a good presentation of this subject see Carpenter, *Mental Physiology*, Ch. IX, Pt. 3. A fifth factor, unmentioned by James, is too important to ignore. It is the number of associative bonds which a given image or thought may have with the present state of consciousness. Every conscious state is more or less complex. If two of its elements, *a* and *b*, have been experienced with *m*. *M* is far more likely to be recalled than if it were associated only with *a*. For example, the sight of a Latin word may be by itself unable to suggest its English equivalent; the same may be true of the sound, but sight and sound together may be able to recall it. It is because of this principle that the number of associative paths is so important a factor in goodness of memory. This principle again makes it advisable in memorizing by rote to

read aloud the material being memorized. On the cultivation of the memory, see, in addition to the above, Halleck, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI.

CHAPTER II—THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF THE MENTAL LIFE

INTELLECTUAL SUCCESS AND PHYSICAL VIGOR

Success depends to a very considerable extent upon health, and that not merely in the sense of freedom from disease but also in the sense of abounding physical vigor. The power to concentrate the attention, fullness and accuracy of memory, keenness of analysis, richness of ideas, the ability to trace cause and effect, and in fact every form of intellectual power, depend in a high degree upon the kind and amount of blood that feeds the brain. This is capable of rigorous demonstration for the processes of association and attention, and since they form a large part of every species of intellectual activity, what is proved for them is proved for intellectual activity as a whole. Unfortunately there is no general popular presentation of the facts. If the few citations given below are not accessible, the observations and experience of the members of the class may be appealed to for confirmation of the assertions made in what follows.

The evidence of the dependence upon the brain of attention and association includes the following: (1) Influence of drugs. This may be stimulating or depressing. Alcohol (and in a far less degree tea and coffee) at first quicken the intellectual powers, upon which later a reaction follows. In the case of the excessive use of alcohol, incoherence of thought early makes its appearance, becoming more and more marked as the effects increase, finally giving way to stupor. The effects of opium and chloroform are well known. For a statement, based on careful experiments, of the effects of small doses of alcohol upon the mental processes see *McClure's Magazine* for March, 1909. (2) Fatigue. It has been shown by experiments that mental fatigue diminishes muscular power and muscular fatigue diminishes intellectual power. Carpenter, *Mental Physiology*, Ch. X, p. 441, quotes the following from Sir Henry Holland: "I descended on the same day two very deep mines in the Hartz Mountains, remaining some hours under ground in each. While in the second mine, and exhausted both from

fatigue and inanition, I felt the utter impossibility of talking longer with the German inspector who accompanied me. Every German word and phrase deserted my recollection; and it was not until I had taken food and wine, and been some time at rest, that I regained them again." (3) Mental disease. This includes insanity, of course, but it includes many other diseases also, such as diseases of the memory, for which see Ribot, *Diseases of the Memory*, Chs. II, III, IV, Carpenter, *op. cit.*, Ch. X, pp. 437-439, any medical encyclopedia under the headings Aphasia, Agraphia, Apraxia. On the general subject of the relation of memory to brain activity, Carpenter, *op. cit.*, Ch. X (the details of his anatomy and physiology are now out of date). On the general subject of the relation of mind and brain see James, *Briefer Course*, Ch. VIII. On the relation of intellectual activity and the cerebral blood supply, see James, *Principles I*, 97-99.

It is true that Darwin in science and Spencer in philosophy, Heine in literature, and A. H. Stevens (vice-president of the Southern Confederacy) in politics, were invalids most of their lives; and that in his last years Jay Gould was in the grip of a deadly disease. But these instances in no sense invalidate the general principle which is this: The completest exercise of those intellectual powers with which nature has endowed a man is dependent upon the existence of a high degree of physical vigor.

It is easy to see that each of these men failed or came short in places where he might otherwise have succeeded had he possessed a healthier body. And their success only proves that you can weigh some people down with a big handicap and they will forge ahead of others despite of it. Notwithstanding what has been said, however, the boy or girl with a weak body or indeed with any single physical or intellectual deficiency, or indeed with two or three such deficiencies, need not be discouraged or give up the race. The majority of those whom nature has equipped well, throw away or waste their advantages. Therefore, the handicapped, by patiently and skillfully making the best of every resource they have, especially the excellences of character, will find the world ready to welcome their services and to reward them adequately.

For some additional remarks on the relation of physical and mental health see MacCunn, *The Making of Character*, Part II, Ch. I.

At this place the teacher should point out the fact that the proper management of the body is not merely a matter of good intentions but also of special knowledge; and should call attention to the fact that, with all our ignorance of the subject, there is a body of material of the greatest possible importance which is accepted by all experts on the subject. This material it may not be possible to present in any detail in class. But it would be advisable to make accessible to its members some first class work on hygiene which they could read at their leisure. The work most highly recommended by Dr. Erlanger, professor of physiology in the University of Wisconsin, is *The Human Mechanism:—Physiology, Hygiene, and Sanitation*, by Theodore Hough and W. T. Sedgwick, Ginn & Co., Boston, 1906. Part II deals with hygiene and sanitation, and of this pp. 291-424 deal with personal hygiene. (It is possible that Part II can be purchased separately.) I have myself examined this book as well as a number of others and find it decidedly the best adapted to our purpose of any I have seen. Part II requires for its understanding only the most elementary acquaintance with physiology, and yet is adapted equally well to those whose knowledge is more complete.

THE LAW OF HABIT

This topic supplies the transition from physiology to morals. Indeed, it is a topic that lies at the foundation of every department of our subject, intellectual, physical, and moral. Thus association is merely a habit of thinking; because B has been often thought of or experienced immediately after A, the idea of B forms the habit of following the idea of A. The classical discussion of this subject will be found in James, *Principles*, Ch. IV, *Briefer Course*, Ch. X. A still simpler presentation is that of the same author in his *Talks to Teachers*, Ch. VIII. This contains several matters of importance not mentioned in the earlier discussions. Most of what he has left unsaid will be found in MacCunn, *op. cit.*, Pt. 1, Ch. 6.

One very important topic not referred to directly by either of these writers is the effect of habit in making that pleasant

which was originally disagreeable. The most important illustration of this fact for our purpose is in the field of work. Few people appear to be endowed with a native love for hard, continuous work. But the habit of hard work, having once become well developed through necessity, ambition, a sense of duty, or any other cause whatever, will become first endurable, then a source of some slight degree of satisfaction, till finally, if other factors enter which are discussed in Part II, it may become one of the chief delights of life. Other illustrations of the same principle (from Mathews, *Getting on in the World*, page 161) are the following: "When Franklin was superintending the erection of some forts on the frontier, as a defense against the Indians, he slept at night in a blanket on the hard floor, and on his first return to civilized life, could hardly sleep in a bed. Captain Ross and his crew, having been accustomed during their polar wanderings to lie on the frozen snow or the bare rock, afterwards found the accommodations of a whaler too luxurious for them, and they were obliged to exchange their hammocks for chairs." It is from this effect of habit in making (in conjunction with other factors, to be sure) work—the foundation of all genuine morality—delightful, and the effect of repetition in dulling the pleasures of sense, that the Chinese proverb gets its very considerable measure of truth: "He who finds pleasure in vice and pain in virtue is still a novice in both."

Among other subjects that may be profitably discussed at this point are, first, what Professor James calls The Gospel of Relaxation. See his *Talks to Students on Life*, I (in *Talks to Teachers*, page 199). A second one is the advisability of "sowing wild oats." It may be approached through an examination of the thesis of Kipling's story, *Thrown Away*, in *Plain Tales from the Hills*. The thesis is that if the puppy is allowed to eat all the soap he wants he will become sick of it himself and he will be saved from the evil consequences of later indulgence. Contrast that thesis with the following well known words: "The law of the harvest is that we reap more than we sow. Sow an act and you reap a habit; sow a habit and you reap a character; sow a character and you reap a destiny." Beware, however, of exaggeration in interpreting and illustrating this latter principle.

CHAPTER III—CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL MORAL QUALITIES

THE ART OF SELF-CONTROL

Its Importance As a Means to Success, and How to Acquire It

See MacCunn *op. cit.*, Book IV, Ch. 2. The fundamental principle upon which effective control is based has been stated by Professor James, in his *Talks to Teachers* (p. 192 ff.) as follows. While he is referring to the control of others, the principle applies equally well to self-control. "There are two types of inhibition. We may call them inhibition by repression or by negation, and inhibition by substitution, respectively. The difference between them is that, in the case of inhibition by repression, both the inhibited idea and the inhibiting idea, the impulsive idea and the idea that negates it, remain along with each other in consciousness, producing a certain inward strain or tension there: whereas, in inhibition by substitution, the inhibiting idea supersedes altogether the idea which it inhibits, and the latter quickly vanishes from the field.

"For instance, your pupils are wandering in mind, are listening to a sound outside the window, which presently grows interesting enough to claim all their attention. You can call the latter back again by bellowing at them not to listen to those sounds, but to keep their minds on their books or on what you are saying. And, by thus keeping them conscious that your eye is sternly on them, you may produce a good effect. But it will be a wasteful effect and an inferior effect; for the moment you relax your supervision the attractive disturbance, always there soliciting their curiosity, will overpower them, and they will be just as they were before: whereas, if, without saying anything about the street disturbances, you open a counter-attraction by starting some very interesting talk or demonstration yourself, they will altogether forget the distracting incident, and without any effort follow you along. There are many interests that can never be inhibited by the way of negation. To a man in love, for example, it is literally impossible, by any effort of will, to annul his

passion. But let 'some new planet swim into his ken,' and the former idol, will immediately cease to engross his mind.

"It is clear that in general we ought, whenever we can, to employ the method of inhibition by substitution."

VERACITY

Questions for the Class

1. (a) Is it possible to lie by other means than the use of words, e. g., by actions? (b) Can a person lie by keeping silent? (c) By making no statement not in itself literally true and yet omitting certain other facts in the case? (d) Did the young man lie who came in at three o'clock in the morning, and told his father, when he next saw him, that he had come in at a quarter of twelve (three being a quarter of twelve)? (e) What, then, is a lie? 2. Is a statement made on insufficient evidence a lie? 3. When we talk, we do so, normally, not to exhibit ourselves as persons of virtuous characters, but to communicate facts. Is something more required of us, then, than the intention to say exactly what we believe? 4. What are the consequences to the agent of a detected lie? 5. Do we, by lying, increase—if detected—the chances that others will lie to us? 6. If the lie has passed undetected, are there no consequences to the agent similar in kind to those discovered under 4? 7. What are the effects of a lie, even if undetected, upon the character of the agent? 8. Does the habit of lying tend to make us unreliable in our statements even when we intend to speak the truth? 9. What are the effects of lying upon our confidence in others? 10. What are the effects of exaggerated statements, known to be exaggerated? 11. Does even a justifiable lie (assuming that there is such a thing) have any of the bad consequences already discovered? 12. If a physician lies to his patients, what will be the final results? What facts ought the physician to have in mind when deciding whether or not he will adhere rigidly to the truth in his practice? 13. Is it wise to avoid the appearance of deceit even when we are not being guilty of any deception? Make some suggestions as to ways in which we can do this. 14. What are the most common temptations to lie? 15. How can one avoid or conquer these temptations, and thus build up a truthful character.

Notes for the Teacher

1. A lie is an attempt to create in another person a belief which we ourselves do not hold. Such a belief can, of course, be created not merely by a nod of the head or a shrug of the shoulders, but also by spending more money than we can afford in such a way as will make an impression on other people, and by many other actions of the same sort. We may lie by keeping silent. "The cruelest lies are often told in silence. A man may have sat in a room for hours and not opened his teeth and yet come out of that room a disloyal friend or a vile calumniator." (Robert Louis Stevenson in *Virginibus Puerisque*, p. 75). Equally may we lie by suppressing a part of the facts, like the truant boy mentioned by Professor Adler, who entered the school building five minutes before the close of the exercises, and on being asked at home whether he had been at school, promptly answered Yes. We may also lie by using words in one sense which we know will be understood in another; as did the mediaeval saint, who, according to the story, on being asked by some soldiers whether a certain man whom they were pursuing had come that way, thrust his hand up his sleeve and answered, "No, not that way." All these and similar tricky liars one feels like addressing with the words of Leslie Stephen: "If you are going to lie, lie like a man."

2. It follows from the preceding, of course, that a statement which, as a matter of fact, may be true, but which we are not certain is true, is a lie, if we give it out as if we believed it. For we thereby create a false impression as to our own beliefs. Statements which we ourselves look upon as only possible, or perhaps barely probable may in effect be lies, and if they are injurious to other persons may be little better than barefaced slander. Where it is fairly certain that what for us is only a possibility will be taken by our auditor for a probability, and our probability for a certainty, there it is our duty to be silent, especially if what we say can do any harm. This is especially obvious where we may be reasonably sure our auditor will pass our statements on to others in the form which they have taken in his own mind; and many of the meanest, because most cowardly lies, are told in just this way. If we touch a match to dry powder, we cannot lay the blame of the explosion solely upon the gunpowder.

3. Since the aim of the truth teller is to tell the *truth*, veracity involves the obligation to acquaint ourselves with the facts to the best of our powers and opportunities, as the necessary preparation for relating them. This involves freeing ourselves from our prejudices and from the influences of the emotions, especially of the desires, as completely as possible. And it involves the most conscientious care in the use of our intellectual powers. All things, of course, are not of the same importance, and no one will spend the time in searching for the evidence for some insignificant rumor which he may want to repeat, that a detective would give to following up some important trail. But the truthful man will not allow his word to go out as evidence on any important matter until he is certain as to the facts; and where probabilities are the best that he can obtain he will exercise the greatest care in making his words match accurately the degree of his own confidence. Particularly will this be true of reports unfavorable to others. A man of genuine veracity will also train his mind to become an effective agent for distinguishing between truth and error.

4. The consequences to the agent of a detected lie are first of all the distrust of his fellow men; and this distrust will never disappear except in the presence of much evidence of the adoption of better principles, evidence based upon the repeated exhibition of veracity under trying circumstances. We all argue with regard to others, however little we think of applying it to ourselves, that if a man will lie once, he will do it again. It is often extremely probable that any given lie will go undetected, but if we lie this time we shall before long find ourselves in another situation where there is exactly as good a reason to lie as there was before. We shall therefore inevitably lie again unless we have absolutely changed our principles. With this second lie we have virtually become liars, *i. e.*, men who lie habitually, for now we are well started on the road down hill. That a person can go on lying indefinitely, even though it be only somewhat occasionally, and not get caught *once* (and once is all that is necessary) is almost inconceivable. Especially as most lies have to be covered up with new ones.

The man who has lost the confidence of another or others has lost one of the most precious possessions of life. His fel-

lows cannot build upon him. He is to them, instead of a solid rock, a treacherous bog. This confidence has "practical" value. It means a person can be trusted, among other things, to perform services for which there is a material reward. Always, too, it has another value; it brings respect, admiration, and where there is a personal relationship, the affection of others. Thus the regard for permanent advantage, as distinguished from a passing one, would do away with nine-tenths of the lying; and in these cases (without entering for the moment into any discussion about the other tenth) the liar is either a fool or a coward; *i. e.*, either he cannot see, or he has not the backbone to undergo an unpleasant experience or take upon himself some loss. If confidence cannot be obtained without effort and sacrifice, it is in this respect like almost everything else of value in the world; money, for instance (under ordinary circumstances). The law of life, to which there are few exceptions, is: Nothing for nothing.

5. If we lie and are detected, we not only lose the confidence of others, but increase greatly the chances that others will lie to us. In the first place, the ape which dwells in every human being tends to make him imitate what we have done. In the second place, there is the retaliatory desire to pay back the liar in his own coin. The boys at Rugby would not lie to Dr. Arnold; they considered that shameful. Judge Lindsey, the "kid judge" of the Denver Juvenile Court, has sent over 500 prisoners to the various institutions of detention in the state, without guard, often with the money in their pocket with which to buy their railroad ticket, has sent them solely on their honor, and only seven have made even a first attempt to run away. Such power of awakening the best in other men is rare. It involves a high degree of tact as well as of character. But the higher the standards of honor in a man, the more does he tend to awaken this feeling in others. And, at the lowest, he at least refrains from waking the worst in them. "The good man," says Mr. Spencer, "lives in a better world than the bad man."

6. If, now, the lie has passed undetected, has it been without effects upon the credit in which we are held? No, for, in the first place, there is the chance that, though not caught, we have been suspected. A person ordinarily tells a lie in a some-

what different way from what he tells the truth. There may be hesitation or there may be defiance. There may be the avoiding of catching the eye of the auditor or there may be a bold facing him. In any event, except perhaps for the seasoned liar, there is a difference which will very seldom escape the attention of the keen reader of character, and which often forces itself upon the attention even of the most stupid. But, of course, we may escape suspicion, especially if a good actor (curiously enough, although there are very few good actors, almost everyone counts himself in the number). There is, however, one loss which is as inevitable as the action of gravitation. If a man tells the truth in the face of a temptation not to do so, others will recognize him at once as a truthful man, and he will advance just so much in their confidence. Of this chance to increase the confidence of others in us, every lie necessarily robs us; and if we are never found saying what is to our own disadvantage or what is disagreeable at the moment to say, in the end people will begin to suspect our veracity, and, if the matter is of any importance to them, to watch us carefully.

7. The preceding are the direct effects of a lie upon the confidence which other people have in us. There is, in addition, a network of effects upon our character. One of these has already been referred to—a habit of lying has been started, a habit that will develop with great rapidity; for, as has been well said, it is easy to tell one lie, but hard to tell only one lie. Now one consequence of this has already been referred to: Nothing but a miracle can save the habitual liar from being found out. But there are other consequences. Unless he is steeped in self-conceit—a state which, agreeable as it may be in some respects, has penalties of its own almost as bad as opium eating—he can have no peace because of the fear of detection. Furthermore, his unwillingness to face the disagreeable, in other words his cowardice, tends to infect the entire character. I do not say it does so necessarily, for the character of man is ordinarily anything but a consistent whole. But the tendency is strong in that direction. If it *does* spread, the man is lost, for this world is no place for cowards.

8. Again, the habitual liar constantly fails to tell the truth even where he does not mean to lie, *i. e.*, he becomes in-

accurate in his statements. "He who is always anxious to tell the truth is always anxious to have the truth to tell;" and the reverse holds also. But since in our communications with others, they want not merely good intentions, but the truth itself, we lose through our inaccuracies another form of confidence which we cannot afford to throw away.

9. But a lie, whether detected or not, revenges itself upon us in another way—it makes it impossible, or at least difficult, to believe in the truthfulness of others. "You cannot believe in honor until you have achieved it," says Bernard Shaw. "Better keep yourself clean and bright: you are the window through which you must see the world." A childlike confidence in the complete goodness of every human being is not a desirable equipment for the young man or young woman to start life with. But the cynical belief that every one is a liar and a thief is equally mischievous.

"Be noble, and the nobleness that lies

In other men, sleeping, but never dead

Will rise in majesty to meet thine own."

Thomas Arnold and Judge Lindsey have shown that these are the words of sober truth, and while so much influence as theirs is not given to many men, however elevated in character, it is true that excessive suspicion creates no inconsiderable percentage of the treachery and deceit which it fears. It is a prophet which brings its own prophecies to pass.

10. It must not be overlooked that exaggerated or inexact statements, known to be such, do their part in making the communication of thought impossible. A person overwhelms you with thanks for some very insignificant favor, as passing the butter. What language is there left to him with which to express his gratitude for real favors? Popular habits of exaggeration have removed from the language at our disposal a number of its finest words, such as awful and terrible, just as the once overpolite "you" for "thou" has robbed us of our personal pronoun in the second person plural.

11 and 12. People are fond of asking, May a man not lie under these circumstances or that? They should rather ask: Must he lie? For even a lie that, in the end, we must pronounce justifiable has many of the same effects as the worst lie (the precise differences can be easily worked out by the class).

A man overworks to save himself from bankruptcy and thus keep his family from starvation. His action may be justifiable under the circumstances, and his motives are undoubtedly the best, but the effects of the breakdown in health will be just as serious for all that. Much the same thing is true of lying. And apart from everything said above, there is a danger, even in the most easily justified lie, which must not be ignored. If a person succeeds in skating on thin ice he is tempted to try to skate on still thinner, and it is easier to find a justification before the bar of conscience for a second lie than it was for the first one. This does not mean that no one should ever lie. It means you do it at your peril, whatever the motive. We see beautifully the workings of the lie commonly considered justifiable in those of the physician or nurse to the patient. They have made nearly all communication between the physician and the patient with regard to what most vitally concerns the latter, practically impossible. It was with just this situation in view that a very able specialist in nervous diseases told me he made it an unvarying policy to answer every question of his patient truthfully. In consequence he had gradually acquired a reputation for so doing, and though he had had some very painful experiences with incurable patients, yet when he did tell a sick person there was some hope, the patient believed him implicitly, and got the corresponding benefit.

14. It is useful to consider what are the most common temptations to lie in order that we may the more effectually guard against them. They are enumerated by Mrs. Cabot in *Everyday Ethics* (pp. 273 ff) as follows: (1) Lies of careless or imaginative misstatement; (2) Lies of thoughtlessness—"the careless, unweighed, exaggerated statements which flutter about the air, lighting here and there, such as he is a perfect brute, said of a man whom we have once seen flog a horse;" (3) Lies of shyness or embarrassment; (4) Lies of cowardice; (5) Lies of self-assertion and ambition; (6) Lies of kindness (mistaken or otherwise).

15. The best methods of meeting the temptation to the last kind of lie are well described in the same book, Chapter XX. An example follows. "Do you like my sketch of Santa Barbara?" asked a sensitive artist. Well, in fact you do not,

but merely to say 'no' is often to give him the false impression that you think *all* his work a failure. Therefore, to be thoroughly truthful, you must not only say what you mean, but try your best to make him see what you mean. If you put yourself in his place, your utterance of the fragmentary, though literal truth, will be checked, and you will so phrase your criticism that while he will realize the lack which you feel in this canvas, he will also be kept mindful of the warm approval which you feel for the genuineness and sincerity expressed in this faulty sketch as well as in all his work, and the pleasure you take in other paintings of his. . . . The artist shows you his sketch of Santa Barbara and you do not like it. What can you truthfully say? Perhaps your instinct will be to say nothing at all, and in some cases this is the best solution, but a sensitive person may feel the condemnation of silence more trying, because of its myriad possibilities, than any definite word. If you know nothing of art, you can truly say that you do not feel competent to judge the picture. You can point out any bit of line or color that does appeal to you, and if you are genuinely interested in the artist, ask to see other pictures of his that you may like better, or to see the same picture again. If you are an artist, your suggestions will be really valuable, and detailed criticism which can be turned to account is of far more significance to the artist than indiscriminate praise. It is usually the vagueness or the wholesale quality of a condemnation that makes it hard to receive. If criticism is given in such a definite way and so linked to commendation that the means of improvement are suggested, any earnest worker will, when he has thought it over, be glad to have had it. Anyone who is doing serious work receives the keenest criticism through the success or failure of that work. He knows this, and he is hungry for any intelligent suggestions that will forestall future failure. Flattery is a stone when he wants bread, and even the most shining and polished gem of politeness falls to feed the hungry."

But veracity is not something that can be separated from the rest of the character. The only safe way to attempt to destroy the tendency to lie is to raise the entire character to a place in which the lie is felt to have no place. We may quote Mrs. Cabot once more. "Truth-speaking is not a recipe

for making life easy, but for making it worth while; and no one who has thoroughly tested the results of frank, accurate, reliable speech and action will want to go back into the vitiated air of lying. It is evident, however, that truth-telling can surely be based only on right living. If we are sympathetic, generous, courageous, just, it will be possible to be open and true. In so far as we are bitter, avaricious, cowardly, self-deceitful, we shall find it hard to be wholly sincere with others. We can not isolate truthfulness. To demand truth of ourselves is therefore to demand uprightness; thus truth becomes the guardian of our character."

INTEGRITY AS AN ASSET IN BUSINESS

By integrity is meant reliability or trustworthiness in all its forms, veracity, faithfulness to agreements of every kind, and respect for others' property. The last includes not merely honesty in relation to their money but also in relation to their time if you have agreed to sell yours to them.

On the subject of the relation of integrity to success in business, it is possible to make general statements only with regard to tendencies. Success is normally due to the co-operation of several factors of which integrity is but one. Therefore the influence of the latter may be masked or even neutralized at times. The problem of tendencies is none the less important for that reason, for it is by studying the direction of tendencies—in other words by studying probabilities—that wise men guide their conduct. Drunkenness, for example, tends to undermine health and shorten life, as the statistics compiled by the life insurance companies prove. Accordingly, though occasionally an habitual drunkard has lived to extreme old age, apparently in vigorous health, such a fact has no influence whatever upon a man of sense.

The rule, then, is that integrity produces confidence, and that confidence is an essential condition for profitable business dealings between men. This holds for business relations of every sort, whether that of employee to employer, merchant to customer, the man who would borrow to the man that can lend, or whatever it may be. That this is the rule can be discovered by applying the principles that came to light in our study of veracity to the broader problem of confidence in all

its forms in their application to business life. Confirmation in the way of concrete examples can be found in the following magazine articles: *The Borrower as a Banker Sees Him* in *The World's Work* 1:534 (March, 1901); *Character as a Credit Asset*, *Ibid.*, 10:6437 (July, 1905); *The New Art of Nursing Business* (an art that can be exercised only where there is absolute confidence in the character of the party concerned), *Ibid.*, 15:9951 (March, 1908); *A Commonplace Business Career*, in *The World Today*, 15:852 (August, 1908). The first two of these articles are *per se* the most convincing, but the last will probably be most interesting to high school boys. For the competence obtained by this high school graduate, as a result, in good part, of the confidence which his fellow townsmen felt in him, is not beyond what some of the more intelligent members of the class may fairly look forward to for themselves, provided they possess a sterling character and the willingness to work hard with both hands and brain. The first article in the list tells of a grocer in New York City who, in a time of sore need, was loaned six thousand dollars by a bank when the total security he could offer amounted in itself to but six thousand dollars. It was loaned, of course, not from sympathy with him,—which would have been a criminal act—but because a very careful investigation had demonstrated his integrity, industry, and good business habits. After telling the story, the writer continues:

“The inference as to the business methods and the business principles of these days to be drawn from the Eighth Avenue grocer's experience were so extremely optimistic that I did not dare set them down as typical of all similar transactions before I knew whether the same conditions were observed in financial establishments where business is done, not by thousands of dollars, but by hundreds of thousands and by millions. So I went to the head of the great banking house of Spencer Trask and Company and asked him how far integrity was an element in determining credit. In substance this is what Mr. Trask said:

“There is nothing more important to the banker who is asked to extend credit than the integrity of the applicant. If he is a man of bad repute, of known dishonesty, no banker wishes to deal with him. If he can lay down gilt-edged se-

curity, it may be accepted, but not in any way that will cause the bank to feel that it has run the slightest risk in any contingency that may arise. A specific case may be used as an illustration: John Doe approaches a banker to ask for money to tide him over some difficulty. He presents his books for the bank's inspection and possibly even his household accounts may be open for investigation. The bank must know not only what sort of a business he has been doing, but must know what his habits regarding paying his debts have been, whether he has been living beyond his income—in short his whole business character must be laid bare. If the result of that examination satisfies the bank that he deserves to be helped, the money he needs will be lent him; perhaps the one bank may not be willing to lend him all he needs, but it will take a share with other banks in relieving him. Now the point is, that man may not have much surplus in money. He may not be "worth," as the phrase goes, anything at all. The bank is relying, not so much on what he has in money, but what he has in integrity. The bank can tell from his books whether he is likely to do well or ill after the money has been lent him. If the signs point to success and his integrity is established, the loan is made. His established integrity is assurance that the loan will be used for the purpose for which it was made."

Confidence in proved integrity has been a fundamental factor in the success of men all the way up from the grocer of Eighth Avenue to those who stand upon the topmost round of the ladder of wealth and fame. As illustrations from the latter class it will be sufficient to mention three names, Marshall Field, Charles L. Tiffany, and J. Pierpont Morgan. For Mr. Field see *The Outlook*, 82:152 (Jan. 27, 1906) and *The Independent*, 60:228 (Jan. 25, 1906). All accounts agree as to the literal and complete truthfulness of the statement made at the time of Mr. Field's death by his friend Mr. Franklin MacVeagh, (the present Secretary of the Treasury) which, as quoted in *The Independent*, reads as follows: "All of Mr. Field's money was fairly made, and he was conspicuous among the immensely rich for the fairness of his competition and the cleanness of his methods. He made no money through oppression and monopoly. He built himself upon no man's ruin. And his business methods from the beginning to the end were

so instructive and influential that his fellow-citizens were constantly helped by his example. These methods by their conspicuously high standards became contributions to the citizenship of Chicago."

For Mr. Tiffany see the *Review of Reviews*, 25:433 (April, 1902). "Mr. Tiffany's motto in business," says this article, "was to serve his clients better than anyone else and to do it honestly. At the age of eighty-eight he said that he had never seen the time when he could not make money by doing both." The reputation which is enjoyed by the great jewelry house which he founded is a sufficient confirmation of his claim of honest dealing.

For Mr. Morgan see *The World's Work*, 1:610 (April, 1901) and 5:3164 (March, 1903). In the former article, we may read this statement: "If the best-informed men of affairs in the United States today were asked to name the most masterful personality in the country, perhaps in the world, today, most of them would name Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan. Within a month (April, 1901), by his strong hand two of the greatest transactions in the history of practical affairs have been consummated—the great railway consolidation which gives one 'community of interest' control of systems from ocean to ocean and of trans-Pacific traffic as well, and, greatest of all, the great steel combination.

"In its last analysis, the making of great combinations, like other successful pieces of work, leads back to strong personalities—in finance to personalities that stand for safety and development. No amount of money, by the sheer force of money, could bring about such results. They imply a confidence in character—most of all in the quality of building up great properties."

As it can be shown that integrity is one of the most fundamental factors in success, so it can be shown that its absence tends to bring failure. In *The World's Work* for March, 1902 (3:1811; cf. 5:3273) may be found some reflections of the editor upon Bradstreet's analysis of the causes of business failures in the United States in 1901. His conclusion is: "Success, if these figures give a clue to it, is won by the eminently good American traits of character and industry and skill" (and lost, as appears, by the absence of one or more of them).

The effects of the absence of character are shown in a tragic way by the disastrous termination of what promised to be almost the most brilliant career in the annals of American business life, that of Charles M. Schwab. When less than forty years old he was chosen the first president of the great United States Steel Corporation. Soon afterward he became engaged in an outside enterprise, the shipyard combination, which "appears in the light of judicial opinion to have been at best a gambling speculation; at worst, something still more culpable;" and as a direct result "his kite was lowered because a lack of moral ballast was evident to the business men holding the string." See *The Nation* 77:25 (July 9, 1903 cf. Jan. 23, 1902, p. 64); and *The Outlook* 74:920 (Aug. 15, 1903). He has never regained a position of importance in the business world since that time, and is now, to all intents and purposes, an outcast. (For an account of his life to 1902 see *The Cosmopolitan Magazine*, 33:284). A still more impressive illustration of our principle may be found in the results of the life insurance investigation in New York. See the series of articles on this subject in Vol. 11 of *The World's Work*.

The general tendency that thus comes to light is obscured oftentimes by certain facts which must now be considered. In the first place, wealth brings prominence. Accordingly, those who succeed in amassing large sums of money during a career of dishonesty are, from the very nature of the case the objects of public attention, and where their wealth is directly due to theft or some scandalous failure to keep faith, their very crimes give them a certain amount of notoriety. But of those who sink and are drowned because weighted by a load of dishonesty or trickery we seldom or never hear. The following case was told me by an intimate business associate of the man whose life is described. A certain young man came to New York without friends or other influence and, solely by his own merits, worked himself up to a position where he was getting a salary of fifteen thousand dollars a year. The crowning achievement of his business career was the working out, under the direction of, but with practically no help from his superior, of the plan of one of the most difficult and successful consolidation schemes ever consummated in this country. After that, like Mr. Schwab, he lost his head and entered upon

a course of business trickery. The result was, he was deprived of his position. He was offered an inferior one elsewhere but scorned it. Disappointment and then despair started him drinking. The last time my informant saw him, he came into the latter's office to "borrow" a couple of dollars. A few months later he died of alcoholic poisoning in a public hospital, and his old friends took up a collection to pay his funeral expenses and to provide his widow with a little ready money. A career of this sort does not supply many "stories" for the newspapers. Yet in our great cities it has doubtless been duplicated in its essential features thousands of times.

In the second place, the success of dishonest men may be due wholly or in part to good qualities which they possess. Thus, if we can judge from the facts accessible to the public, Mr. Harriman is one of the most unprincipled men that ever gained a permanent hold upon great possessions in this country. Yet there is another side to his business life. What is probably the fundamental source of the permanence and magnitude of his success is pointed out in the following words from an article in *The World's Work*, 17:11,305: "Most of these railroads came into his hands because they were ill-managed by their preceding owners, and he has improved every one over which he has secured a real control." Elsewhere (13:8445) it is said of him, together with his fellow railroad kings: "Financial exploitation is among these men secondary to the development of the area which they rule. No man can say of any of them at the present moment that he has lost sight of his duty and the duty of his railroads to the people whom they serve." If the inner life of this man were ever laid bare, it would probably be found that, like a man of similar methods, Cecil Rhodes, he was a dreamer of imperial dreams, dreams of a society more prosperous and greater than any which ordinary men can conceive to be possible. This is not said to condone any of his wrong doing, but to exhibit the principles illustrated by his career.

In the third place, it must be remembered that there are a number of personal characteristics that tend to produce success, character, temperament, and intellectual ability. Furthermore, in exceptional cases, sheer chance may play the leading rôle (about as in whist). Where, therefore, a man has in-

tellectual powers that rise to the level of genius, or where lucky opportunities have offered themselves to him almost for the asking, still more where these two conditions have combined in his favor, he may be very successful in business without possessing a high character. However, the question arises in the case of such men, whether an equal amount of success could not have been obtained honestly. Indeed our analysis of the relation between success and the possession of the confidence of others raises the question whether the dishonesty of some rich men may not have been as much of a handicap to them as ill-health was to Darwin. The fact that they themselves would laugh at such an idea proves nothing. For many clever money-getters, like many successful politicians, are of very much contracted vision. And if they have happened to grow up in the midst of traditions to the effect that dishonesty is the best policy, they may, for all their cleverness of a certain kind, very well fail to see that any other way than what to them is at once the customary and apparently the easiest road is the best one. The New York of the second quarter of the nineteenth century had no lack of able retail merchants, men who would have scorned the notion that they did not know how to get the maximum amount of money out of their business. This was "a time when it was thought good business to deceive the public, till certain houses [they were an insignificant number at first], like that of Alexander T. Stewart, with this wiser egoism, built up a great fortune by giving the public exactly what they said they would, and the best merchants have done the same thing ever since" (*The World's Work*, 1:509). To take another example, this time from our own day. The directors of many corporations believe it good business to get desired legislation by bribery; but the experience, a few years ago, of one of our great business men, Mr. Emerson McMillan, with the corrupt gang in possession of the government of St. Louis seems to show that the very reverse may be the case. See *The World's Work*, 2:1202. For further evidence that widely adopted business methods may be abandoned because discovered to be unprofitable in the end, see *Ibid.*, 8:4955.

The fact of the matter is that many people have an extremely exaggerated idea of the number of fortunes in this

country that have been obtained by dishonest means. They apparently ignore the great amount of business ability of a very high order that is to be found among the American people, or else do not realize that ability of a high order can see what will never be revealed to mediocre eyes, ways and means of *legitimate* advancement. They seem to forget that we live in the midst of a rapidly increasing population, in a land filled with the richest natural resources waiting to be used by ability backed by capital. They have been misled by the men with the muck-rake, of whom there are not a few representatives in every community, most of whom, moreover, were at work long before the newspapers and magazines got to running on this subject. But suspicion whispers what envy gladly hears, and thus many an honorable name is besmirched, to the great loss of us all. There are plenty of criminal rich men abroad in the land, thanks, in no small part, to the self-imposed impotence of our courts. And the great money prizes fall, as a rule, only to those who are willing and able to run in a very strenuous race. But excellent sources of information at my disposal enable me to assert with confidence that the great majority of precisely our leading men who are engaged in legitimate occupations are honest in their dealings with each other and do not believe that, in the long run, dishonesty pays. For further information on this subject see *The World's Work*, 9:5596; 11:7066; 13:8437; 17:11082; *The Atlantic Monthly*, 93:194. All my informants who can look back upon a business experience in great cities covering two generations, agree with the statement of Washington Gladden in the *Outlook*, 63:871 ff., that in matters of honesty the conduct of business is today on a distinctly higher plane than it was fifty or sixty years ago.

DIRECT INTEREST IN OTHERS AS A BUSINESS ASSET

Business men are gradually discovering that a direct interest in their employees and their customers is a very valuable business asset. "If you want to do a big business you have to give people their money's worth; if you want to make people feel at home in your place of business, you have to give them a homelike welcome; if you want to get the most out of your employees, you have to do all you can to make them take an

interest in your work, by making their work pleasant and profitable to them; if you want your horse to do a good day's work, you must give him plenty of corn." (Waldo P. Warren, *Thoughts on Business*, p. 130). A man who is entirely selfish may, of course, consult the interests of employees and customers merely for the sake of his own success, but unless he is generous without calculation, he is not likely to be so from calculation. He will be rather inclined to think that "the horse will not miss one ear of corn." The human hog is a nearsighted animal; and "a penny held close to the eye would obscure a chest of gold ten feet away." (Warren).

Another quality of great value in business life, as indeed in every department of life, is courtesy. This is generosity in small matters. It means putting the curb on the tongue, when irritated, in order to spare the feelings of the very person who is irritating you. It means doing little favors, even for uninteresting people, at the expense of time or effort. It means treating all men, their interests, their views, their tastes and their character, with all the respect and deference that insight illumined by sympathy demands. It means entering into their plans, their pride in their conquests, their hopes and fears, with an attention born of interest. It means willingness to co-operate, to take what comes with good humor, to be easily pleased where good will is shown. It means these things and, in the last analysis, it means much more. For the man who carries the spirit of courtesy into all his relations with his fellow-men will be found to have passed imperceptibly from small things to great, and such a man is no other than he whose daily life is described in the thirteenth chapter of *First Corinthians*. It will be obvious that the art of being courteous can not be learned from books on etiquette. It is the outward expression of an inner spirit. Wherefore he that would have the former must cultivate the latter.

Where courtesy is united with the quickness, keenness, and thoroughness of perception that enable you to get your fellow-man's point of view, and the resourcefulness that suggests to the mind the best method of dealing with the situation, the result is tact,—at once the most beautiful and one of the most useful of the fruits of well-rounded, highly-developed personality. It involves, as is obvious, certain qualities of intellect,

but, as appears clearly in the following analysis, its foundation is character. If we analyze tact, says Mr. Warren, (*op. cit.*, p. 42) we find that it is made up of certain elements:

"A sympathetic knowledge of human nature, its fears, weaknesses, expectations, and inclinations.

"The ability to put yourself in the other person's place and to consider the matter as it appears to him.

"The magnanimity to deny expression to such of your thoughts as might unnecessarily offend another.

"The ability to perceive quickly what is the expedient thing, and the willingness to make the necessary concessions.

"The recognition that there are millions of different human opinions of which your own is but one.

"A spirit of unfeigned kindness such as makes even an enemy a debtor to your innate good will.

"A patience that supplants accusation with the opportunity for self-discovery.

"A recognition of what is customary under the circumstances and a gracious acceptance of the situation.

"Gentleness, cheerfulness and sincerity—and such variations as the spirit of these may suggest."


Where a strong will—the power to control self, and to overcome obstacles from without as well as from within—is united with generosity and courtesy, and with a fair measure of intellectual ability, the success obtained is usually out of all proportion to the intellectual qualities themselves. Says Mr. Lecky (*The Map of Life*, p. 318): "In nearly all administrative posts, in all the many fields of labor where the task of man is to govern, manage, or influence others, to adjust or harmonize antagonisms of race, or interests, or prejudices, to carry through difficult business without friction and by skilful cooperation, this combination of gifts is supremely valuable. It is much more valuable than brilliancy, eloquence, or originality. I remember the comment of a good judge of men on the administration of a great governor who was pre-eminently remarkable for this combination. 'He always seemed to gain his point, yet he never appeared to be in antagonism with anyone.' The steady pressure of a firm and consistent will was scarcely felt when it was accompanied by the ready recognition of everything that was good in the argument of another,

and by a charm of manner and of temper which seldom failed to disarm opposition and win personal affection."

On this subject see Emerson, *The Conduct of Life*, Essay on Behavior; Lecky, *The Map of Life*, Ch. XV; Mathews, *Getting on in the World*, Ch. XI, and pp. 319-322; *The Outlook*, 79: 165-6; *The World's Work*, 6: 3520, and 11: 6900.

GENERAL WORKS ON THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN BUSINESS.

The following seem to me worthy of special recommendation: H. N. Higinbotham, *The Making of a Merchant*, Chicago, Forbes & Co., 1906 (\$1.50); Mr. Higinbotham was the president of the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, and a member of the firm of Marshall Field and Co. W. P. Warren, *Thoughts on Business*, two series, Forbes & Co., 1907 (\$1.25 each); Sir Arthur Helps, *Essay Written in the Intervals of Business*, Macmillan (40 cents); Mathews, *Getting on in the World*, Scott, Foresman and Co. (\$1.50).



PART II

THE NATURE OF SUCCESS

CHAPTER I—HAPPINESS IS AN INNER STATE

The mistake about happiness most commonly made, especially in America, is confusing it with certain of its external causes, as wealth or power or social position. In his essay *The Lantern Bearers* (in *Across the Plains*) R. L. Stevenson says: "To miss the joy is to miss all. In the joys of the actors lies the sense of any action." Show how this statement enables us to correct the above mistake.

That no external cause as professional or business success, or wealth, or position, is a sufficient guarantee of happiness, is abundantly proved by the testimony of many of those who have had these things in their fullness. The greatest and most admired actor that America has ever produced was Edwin Booth. He had the appreciation of the public, both critical and uncritical, till he himself could say of his later years that they were "tediously successful." Yet this is the way he felt about his life. In 1888, five years before his death, he wrote to his daughter: "Dick Stoddard wrote a poem called 'The King's Bell,' which fits my case exactly. He dedicated it to Lorimer Graham, who never knew an unhappy day in his brief life, instead of to me, who never knew a really happy one. You must not suppose from this that I'm ill in mind or body: on the contrary, I am well enough in both; nor am I a pessimist. I merely wanted you to know that the sugar of my life is bitter-sweet; perhaps not more so than every man's whose experience has been above and below the surface." *Edwin Booth*, by C. T. Copeland—a *Beacon Biography*—p. 150.) Still less can money make life worth living. Nathan Rothschild, an English member of the famous family, who died about 1860, possessed a fabulous fortune, and was said to have, perhaps, had more influence in Great Britain than the two houses of Parliament taken together. "But with all his colossal wealth he was profoundly unhappy, and with sorrowful earnestness exclaimed to one congratulating him on the gorgeous magnificence of his palatial mansion and thence inferring he was happy: 'Happy! Me happy!'" (Mathews, *Getting on in the World*, p. 292; cf. further, on Stephen Girard.) Power, position, and fame cannot procure happiness. A few years before his death Bismarck said: "Seldom in my life have I been a

happy man"; and Charles V of Spain, one of the most powerful kings that ever lived, said publicly, on giving up his throne, that the greatest prosperities which he had enjoyed had been mixed with so many adversities that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. It might be urged that the lives of these two statesmen were poisoned with excess of toil and anxiety. The same could not be said, however, of Madame de Maintenon, the wife of Louis XIV of France. Never have greater luxury and magnificence been at the disposal of any human being. All the resources, material and intellectual, that the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most highly civilized and highly gifted nation of the seventeenth century could supply were absolutely at her disposal. In social position, though not of royal lineage, she was, nevertheless, the first lady of the land. Her power was limited only by the will of the king who loved her. Her fame, as a central figure in one of the most brilliant and powerful courts in history, was secure. Yet in a letter to a favorite niece she wrote: "Alas that I can not give you my experience, that I can not show you the weariness of soul by which the great are deoured—the difficulty which they find in getting through their days! Do you not see how they die of sadness in the midst of that fortune which has been a burden to them? I have been young and beautiful; I have tasted many pleasures; I have been universally beloved. At a more advanced age I have passed years in the intercourse of talent and wit, and I solemnly protest to you that all conditions leave a frightful void" (Lamartine, *Memoirs of Celebrated Characters*, Fenelon. Eng. tr. Vol. II, p. 339).

These utterances do not prove that happiness is impossible. For each can be matched by one of the opposite tenor. Thus Benjamin Franklin, in the second paragraph of his *Autobiography*, writes: "This good fortune, when I reflect on it, which is frequently the case, has indeed sometimes led me to say that if I were left to my choice I should have no objection to go over the same life from its beginnings to its end; requesting only the advantage authors have of correcting in a second edition the faults of the first. So would I also wish to change some incidents of it for others more favorable. Notwithstand-

ing, if this condition was denied, I should still accept the offer of recommencing the same life."

Franklin was so exceptional a man and led so exceptional a life, that it may be urged he is not a fair witness. We may, therefore, listen to the testimony of a typical successful merchant, Peter Cooper (the founder of Cooper's Institute in New York). When a friend asked him about his belief concerning a future life, he replied: "I sometimes think that if one has too good a time here below there is less reason for him to go to Heaven. I have had a very good time, but I know poor creatures whose lives have been spent in a constant struggle for existence. They should have some reward hereafter. . . . The only doubts that I have about the future are whether I have not had too good a time on earth." (Parton, *Captains of Industry*, Series I, p. 331.)

Such an attitude towards life may be found equally well among the poor. Hamerton in *The Quest of Happiness*, p. 35, writes as follows: "I used to call occasionally upon an old lady who lived in a provincial town in France where she occupied a flat in a large tenement house, inhabited by people in all ranks of society. It was almost impossible to pass the ground floor without hearing the voice of a woman singing. . . . (She) was a handsome woman of the lower middle class, the mother of eight fine children, and the place where she sang was . . . a gloomy little kitchen, with an outlook on a narrow courtyard, where she slaved from morning to night, as her husband earned but a small salary, and they could not afford to keep a servant. . . . I made the acquaintance of the songstress, and one day I ventured to ask if she could really be as happy as she seemed. The answer was that she had every reason to be satisfied with her lot—she had a good husband, affectionate and healthy children, and though her poverty gave her plenty to do, she was strong and could bear it easily." (Cf. *Ibid.*, Ch. XVII, *Some Real Experiences.*)

What insignificant causes may be the source of happiness is well shown in Robert Louis Stevenson's essay, *The Lantern Bearers* (in his book *Across the Plains*); and with greater variety of illustration in James, *Talks to Students on Life*, II, *On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings* (in his *Talks to Teachers*). How far happiness may be independent of all that

we consider its necessary conditions is shown by the case of Helen Keller. See *e. g.*, *The Outlook*, Feb. 13, 1904, p. 398.

In view of all the above facts, the failure of the members of the first group to obtain happiness might conceivably be attributed to either (1) an innate incapacity for real happiness; or (2) a failure, lying beyond their control, to obtain the satisfaction of some great need, a failure that cast a shadow over everything else in life; or (3) the disregard of sources of happiness that lay within their power to obtain, but which they ignored, perhaps because they were so preoccupied with the means that they forgot all about the end. In any event it is obvious that the pursuit of happiness, as far as its attainment lies within our power, calls not merely for skill in the selection and pursuit of the means, but still more for wisdom, or the knowledge of the comparative value of the different ends. If it should turn out that life's real shipwrecks are due in any great measure to the third of the above mentioned reasons, we should be justified in asserting with Henry Drummond (*Pax Vobiscum*, p. 31): "Few men know how to live. We grow up at random, carrying into mature life the merely animal methods and motives which we had as little children. And it does not occur to us that all this must be changed; that much of it must be reversed; that life is the finest of the fine arts; that it has to be learned with lifelong patience, and that the years of our pilgrimage are [I should prefer to say may be] all too short to master it triumphantly." Cf. the contrasted pictures in Smiles' *Thrift*, p. 288.

What, then, are the elements of a genuinely successful, or, in other words, happy life; a life, that is to say, really worth living, one which, when we come to the end, we can look back upon with the same satisfaction that Franklin felt in looking back upon his life? There is no one recipe that holds for everyone, because of differences in aptitudes, capacities, and tastes. But while no two human beings are absolutely alike, no two are absolutely different, so that it is conceivable that there may be certain general principles that hold for everyone. An attempt to help the student to discover a few of these principles will be made in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II—PALEY'S ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS

William Paley was a famous clergyman of the Church of England who lived in the eighteenth century. An adequate sketch of his life will be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Whatever he says on the conduct of life is well worth considering because he was a man of wide experience and good powers of observation, and because he was entirely free from cant. For these reasons and others which will become sufficiently evident as we proceed, the chapter on human happiness from his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1788), affords an excellent introduction to the work before us. It can serve, in the main, only as an introduction, however, for it is given over largely to a criticism of popular views on the subject. For our positive doctrine, therefore, we shall have to turn to other sources, valuable as are such remarks as he makes on this part of the subject. In studying the chapter we must ask ourselves: (1) Just what does he mean by each statement? (2) Are his statements true as far as they go? (3) Do they afford an adequate or complete account of the facts?

Paley begins his discussion by defining happiness as the greatest excess of pleasure over pain ordinarily obtainable in life. Many writers on ethics would consider this definition faulty. But even if there be a defect in it this fact need not affect the value of his account of the elements that go to form a happy life. We may accordingly excuse ourselves from the attempt to criticize it.

What follows is, without exception, his own words, and forms the great bulk of the chapter, the omissions being but few and unimportant.

It will be our business to show, if we can,

I. What Human Happiness does not consist in:

II. What it does consist in.

First, then, Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, in whatever profusion or variety they be enjoyed.—By the pleasures of sense I mean, as well the animal gratifications of eating, drinking, and that by which the species is continued, as the more refined pleasures of music, painting, archi-

ture, gardening, splendid shows, theatric exhibitions, and the pleasures, lastly, of active sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing, etc. For,

1st, Those pleasures continue but a little while at a time. This is true of them all, especially of the grosser sort of them. Laying aside the preparation, and the expectation, and computing strictly the actual sensation, we shall be surprised to find how inconsiderable a portion of our time they occupy, how few hours in the four and twenty they are able to fill up.

2dly, These pleasures, by repetition, lose their relish. It is a property of the machine, for which we know no remedy, that the organs by which we perceive pleasure, are blunted and benumbed by being frequently exercised in the same way. There is hardly anyone who has not found the difference between gratification, when new, and when familiar; or any pleasure which does not become indifferent as it grows habitual.

3dly, The eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others; and as such delights fall rarely in our way, the greater part of our time becomes from this cause empty and uneasy.

What I have been able to observe of that part of mankind whose professed pursuit is pleasure, and who are withheld in the pursuit by no restraints of fortune, or scruples of conscience, corresponds sufficiently with this account. I have commonly remarked in such men a restless and inextinguishable passion for variety; a great part of their time to be vacant, and so, much of it irksome; and that, with whatever eagerness and expectation they set out, they become, by degrees, fastidious in their choice of pleasure, languid in the enjoyment, yet miserable under the want of it.

The truth seems to be that there is a limit, at which these pleasures soon arrive, and from which they afterwards decline. They are of necessity of short duration, as the organs cannot hold on their emotions beyond a certain length of time; and if you endeavor to compensate for this imperfection in their nature by the frequency with which you repeat them, you lose more than you gain, by the fatigue of the faculties, and the diminution of sensibility.

We have said nothing in this account of the loss of opportunities, or the decay of faculties, which, whenever they hap-

pen, leave the voluptuary destitute and desperate; teased by desires that can never be gratified, and the memory of pleasures which must return no more.

These pleasures, after all, have their value: and, as the young are always too eager in their pursuit of them, the old are sometimes too remiss; that is, too studious of their ease to be at the pains for them which they really deserve.

Secondly. Neither does happiness consist in an exemption from pain, labor, care, business, suspense, molestation, and "those evils which are without;" such a state being usually attended not with ease, but with depression of spirits, a tastelessness in all our ideas, imaginary anxieties, and the whole train of hypochondriacal affections.

For which reason, it seldom answers the expectations of those who retire from their shops and counting-houses to enjoy the remainder of their days in leisure and tranquillity; much less of such as, in a fit of chagrin, shut themselves up in cloisters and hermitages, or quit the world and their stations in it, for solitude and repose.

Where there exists a known external cause of uneasiness, the cause may be removed, and the uneasiness will cease. But those imaginary distresses which men feel for want of real ones (and which are equally tormenting, and so far equally real), as they depend upon no single or assignable subject of uneasiness, admit oft-times of no application of relief.

Hence a moderate pain, upon which the attention may fasten and spend itself, is to many a refreshment, as a fit of the gout will sometimes cure the spleen. And the same of any less violent agitation of the mind, as a literary controversy, a law-suit, a contested election, and, above all, gaming; the passion for which, in men of fortune and liberal minds, is only to be accounted for on this principle.

Thirdly. Neither does happiness consist in greatness, rank, or elevated station.

Were it true that all superiority afforded pleasure, it would follow, that, by how much we were the greater, that is, the more persons we were superior to, in the same proportion, so far as depended upon this cause, we should be the happier; but so it is, that no superiority yields any satisfaction, save that which we possess or obtain over those with whom we im-

mediately compare ourselves. The shepherd perceives no pleasure in his superiority over his dog; the farmer in his superiority over the shepherd; the lord in his superiority over the farmer; nor the king lastly, in his superiority over the lord. Superiority, where there is no competition, is seldom contemplated; what most men indeed are quite unconscious of.

But if the same shepherd can run, fight, or wrestle better than the peasants of his village; if the farmer can show better cattle, if he keep a better horse, or be supposed to have a longer purse than any farmer in the hundred; if the lord have more interest in an election, greater favor at court, a better house, a larger estate, than any nobleman in the county; if the king possess a more extensive territory, a more powerful fleet or army, a more splendid establishment, more loyal subjects, or more weight and authority in adjusting the affairs of nations than any prince in Europe: in all these cases the parties feel an actual satisfaction in their superiority.

Now the conclusion that follows from hence is this—the pleasures of ambition, which are supposed to be peculiar to high stations, are in reality common to all conditions. The farrier who shoes a horse better, and who is in greater request for skill than any man within ten miles of him, possesses, for all that I can see, the delight of distinction and of excelling as truly and substantially as the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, who have filled Europe with the reputation of their wisdom, their valor, or their knowledge.

No superiority appears to be of any account, but superiority over a rival. This, it is manifest, may exist wherever rivalships do; and rivalships fall out among men of all ranks and degrees. The object of emulation, the dignity or magnitude of this object, makes no difference; as it is not what either possesses that constitutes the pleasure, but what one possesses more than the other.

Philosophy smiles at the contempt with which the rich and the great speak of the petty strifes and competitions of the poor; [the rich] not reflecting that these strifes and competitions are just as reasonable as their own, and the pleasure which success affords, the same.

Our position is that happiness does not consist in greatness. And this position we make out by showing that even

what are supposed to be the peculiar advantages of greatness, the pleasures of ambition and superiority, are in reality common to all conditions. But whether the pursuits of ambition be ever wise, whether they contribute more to the happiness or misery of the pursuers, is a different question; and a question concerning which we may be allowed to entertain great doubt. The pleasure of success is exquisite; so also is the anxiety of the pursuit, and the pain of disappointment—and what is the worst part of the account, the pleasure is short lived. We soon cease to look back upon those whom we have left behind; new contests are engaged in, new prospects unfold themselves; a succession of struggles is kept up whilst there is a rival left within the compass of our views and possession; and when there is none, the pleasure, with the pursuit, is at an end.

II. We have seen what happiness does not consist in. We are next to consider in what it does consist.

In the conduct of life, the great matter is to know beforehand what will please us, and what pleasures will hold out. So far as we know this, our choice will be justified by the event. And this knowledge is more scarce and difficult than at first sight it may seem to be: for sometimes pleasures which are wonderfully alluring and flattering in the prospect, turn out in the possession extremely insipid; or do not hold out as we expected: at other times pleasures start up which never entered into our calculation, and which we might have missed without foreseeing: from whence we have reason to believe that we actually do miss of many pleasures from the same cause. I say, to know "beforehand," for after the experience is tried, it is commonly impracticable to retreat or change; beside that shifting and changing is apt to generate a habit of restlessness, which is destructive of the happiness of every condition.

By reason of the original diversity of taste, capacity, and constitution observable in the human species, and the still greater variety which habit and fashion have introduced in these particulars, it is impossible to propose any plan of happiness which will succeed to all, or any method of life which is universally eligible or practicable.

All that can be said is, that there remains a presumption in favor of those conditions of life in which men generally appear

most cheerful and contented. For though the apparent happiness of mankind be not always a true measure of their real happiness, it is the best measure we have.

Taking this for my guide, I am inclined to believe that happiness consists,

1. In the exercise of the social affections.

Those persons commonly possess good spirits, who have about them many objects of affection and endearment, as wife, children, kindred, friends.

Of the same nature with the indulgence of our domestic affections, and equally refreshing to the spirits, is the pleasure which results from acts of bounty and beneficence, exercised either in giving money, or in imparting to those who want it the assistance of our skill and profession. Another main article of human happiness is

2. The exercise of our faculties, either of body or mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end.

It seems to be true that no plenitude of present gratifications can make the possessor happy for a continuance unless he have something in reserve—something to hope for, and look forward to. This I conclude to be the case from comparing the alacrity and spirits of men who are engaged in any pursuit which interests them, with the dejection and *ennui* of almost all who are either born to so much that they want nothing more, or who have used up their satisfactions too soon, and drained the sources of them.

It is this intolerable vacuity of mind which carries the rich and the great to the horse course and the gaming-table; and often engages them in contests and pursuits of which the success bears no proportion to the solicitude and expense with which it is sought. An election for a disputed borough shall cost the parties twenty or thirty thousand pounds apiece, to say nothing of the anxiety, humiliation, and fatigue of the canvass, when a seat in the House of Commons, of exactly the same value, may be had for a tenth part of the money, and with no trouble. I do not mention this to blame the rich and great (perhaps they cannot do better), but in confirmation of what I have advanced.

Hope, which thus appears to be of so much importance to our happiness, is of two kinds; where there is something to be

done towards attaining the object of our hope, and where there is nothing to be done. The first alone is of any value; the latter being apt to corrupt into impatience, having nothing in its power but to sit still and wait, which soon grows tiresome.

The doctrine delivered under this head may be readily admitted; but how to provide ourselves with a succession of pleasurable engagements is the difficulty. This requires two things; judgment in the choice of *ends* adapted to our opportunities; and a command of imagination, so as to be able, when the judgment has made choice of an end, to transfer a pleasure to the *means*: after which the end may be forgotten as we will.

Hence those pleasures are most valuable, not which are most exquisite in the fruition, but which are most productive of engagement and activity in the pursuit.

Engagement is everything: the more significant, however, our engagements are, the better; such as the planning of laws, institutions, manufactures, charities, improvements, public works; and the endeavoring, by our interest, address, solicitations, and activity, to carry them into effect; or, upon a smaller scale, the procuring of a maintenance and fortune for our families by a course of industry and application to our callings, which forms and gives motion to the common occupations of life; training up a child; prosecuting a scheme for his future establishment; making ourselves masters of a language or a science; improving or managing an estate; laboring after a piece of preferment: and lastly, any engagement which is innocent is better than none; as the writing of a book, the building of a house, the laying out of a garden, the digging of a fish-pond—even the raising of a cucumber or a tulip.

3. Happiness consists in health.

By health I understand, as well freedom from bodily distempers as that tranquillity, firmness, and alacrity of mind, which we call good spirits, and which may properly enough be included in our notion of health, as depending commonly upon the same causes and yielding to the same management as our bodily constitution.

Health, in this sense, is the one thing needful. Therefore

no pains, expense, self-denial, or restraint, to which we subject ourselves for the sake of health, is too much. Whether it requires us to relinquish lucrative situations, to abstain from favorite indulgences, to control intemperate passions, or undergo tedious regimens; whatever difficulties it lays us under, a man who pursues his happiness rationally and resolutely will be content to submit to.

When we are in perfect health and spirits, we feel in ourselves a happiness independent of any particular outward gratification whatever, and of which we can give no account. This is an enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life; and probably constitutes, in a great measure, the happiness of infants and brutes, especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals, as of oysters, periwinkles, and the like; for which I have sometimes been at a loss to find out amusement.

A STUDY OF PALEY'S CRITICISM OF POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF HAPPINESS

I: 1 The Pleasures of Sense and Allied Pleasures Questions for the Class

Are the aesthetic pleasures, as those of natural beauty, literature, music, painting, etc., and "the pleasures of active sports," solely pleasures of sense? That is to say, do we get the pleasure from them solely from our sensations of sight or sound, as in enjoying the scent of a rose we get the pleasure solely from the odor? Give your reasons for your answers. Are the imperfections which Paley finds in the pleasures of sense applicable to the aesthetic pleasures? Are they applicable to "the pleasures of active sports"?

Notes for the Teacher

The aesthetic pleasures all have their basis in sensation, and in some a larger share must be credited to sensation than certain powerful traditions have been willing to admit. But all require also, in a greater or less degree, the activity of the intellect. This exercises itself in holding together different parts which are taken in in succession (memory), in comparing the copy with the original in the imitative arts, in the

work of the constructive imagination, as in building up one's conception of a character or an event from the fragmentary, incomplete accounts given by the novelist or dramatist, and in numerous other ways. Many, and indeed to a certain degree all owe much of their glory to the emotions they arouse; and these emotions, in their turn, may be due to thoughts which the work of art or of nature has awakened in the mind.

The pleasure derived from athletic contests, and from hunting and fishing and similar amusements are decidedly the pleasures of the active, not the passive side of our nature. They rank, though with certain important differences, rather with II:2, "the exercise of our faculties in the pursuit of some engaging end."

As the aesthetic pleasures involve elements which are other than sensational the imperfections of sense pleasures hold only in part for them. They are, in the first place, as permanent as any others. In the second, they are indeed subject to loss of intensity through repetition. But this is a universal rule, applying even (though in a much less degree) to pain. However, the higher the beautiful object in the scale of complexity, the less it is subject to the law of loss through repetition. Mere luxury and display soon pall. People tire of their jewels and are constantly wanting new ones, of their china, their furniture, of the expensive woods in their houses, and the like. On the other hand a lake, or a mountain presents hundreds of different aspects in the course of a year. Great music, like Beethoven's or Wagner's, partly because of its complexity, partly (as a result of this complexity) of its perennial freshness, need never tire. Cheap music, however, soon wearies its most ardent devotees. What is needed is the eye or ear that can penetrate beneath the surface and see or hear the variety of elements which any great work of nature or art contains. The power to do this is, for the average person, the result of training. Perhaps the greatest recent teacher of this art for the world of colors and forms is John Ruskin.

"High and intense delights" of all kinds tend to "take away the relish from all others," merely because of their intensity; but the fact that, the more jaded the man's palate has become through indulgence in the pleasures of sense the more unwilling, commonly, he is to turn to other sources of pleasure

shows that this is not the only reason. The principal reason is that the other pleasures require activity, while the former, being passive, require no effort on his part. "When Mr. Gurney asked an intelligent foreigner who had travelled over the greater part of the world whether he had observed any one quality which, more than another, could be regarded as a universal characteristic of our species, his answer was, in broken English, 'Me tink dat all men *love lazy*.'" (Smiles, *Character*, p. 104). And if the habit of taking one's pleasures passively has once fastened itself upon a person, it is almost impossible to destroy. This is the fundamental reason why sense pleasures tend to destroy the taste for all other kinds. It does not hold for the aesthetic pleasures just in so far as the latter require mental activity. However, as this activity becomes effortless, a temptation to over-indulgence arises which has to be guarded against. The danger that the aesthetic pleasures will destroy all other varieties can only be met by cultivating, at whatever cost, a taste for these other varieties.

The student will have no great difficulty in answering the questions with regard to athletic and field sports for himself, for much the same statements are true of them as are true of the aesthetic pleasures. As between the two, those who are intensely fond of both—and there are a few such persons—would not hesitate a moment in declaring the aesthetic far superior in their intensity, their variety, their fruitfulness or tendency to create new sources of pleasure, their adaptation to all ages and conditions of life, and the dignity and tone they give to life itself.

I: 2 The Place of Pain, Labor, and Care in a Happy Life

Questions for the Class

1. Does Paley mean to recommend pain, labor, care, etc., as desirable in themselves? If not, on what grounds does he recommend them? (Labor here is doubtless used in its original and exact signification to mean, painful exertion). 2. Are "depression of spirits," etc., different names for the same thing? 3. Can you give illustrations from observation or experience bearing upon Paley's assertion that the habitually idle are the victims either of *ennui* or imaginary troubles? (Perhaps your family physician will be willing to tell you of

cases of imaginary anxieties, especially about health, due to emptiness of mind). 4. Give illustrations from the lives of those who have retired from business, or who have never been compelled to earn their living, who have found inactivity intolerable, and have devoted themselves to some pursuit perhaps involving great labor or loss of comfort, or even the bearing of hardship. 5. It might be supposed that those living without pain, labor, etc., could get a great deal of positive happiness from the thought of their freedom from these evils. Is this the case? Give your reasons for your answers. 6. What is the effect of habit upon pain, labor, etc., when not excessive? What is its effect upon depression of spirits, etc.? Illustrate from your own observation, if possible. 7. What are the elements of truth in the common view that pain, labor, and care are among the most serious evils of life? 8. Summarize your own conclusions with regard to the truth of Paley's statements on this subject.

Notes for the Teacher

1. Paley does not mean to assert that these are good in themselves, but rather that (a) (except doubtless in their extreme forms) they are less bad than the other alternative, this alternative being, not starvation, but the states referred to as depression of spirits, etc. He is putting the case of those who are not compelled to earn their living. (b) That they are inseparably conjoined with "the exercise of our faculties in the pursuit of some engaging end," which he regards as one of the most important positive elements of happiness. See below, under II:2. References on drudgery: Hamerton, *The Intellectual Life*, p. 46: "Of all work that produces results, nine-tenths must be drudgery," (See remainder of quotation.); *Ibid*, Part II, Ch. 2: *To an Undisciplined Writer*; Mathews, *op. cit.*, Ch. VIII: *Attention to Details*. (c) Although Paley is apparently not thinking of it, it is a fact that life has a certain flatness or insipidity unless it contains a fair share of hard work and of responsibility, together with the anxiety which the latter normally brings. We realize this when we read the biography of a man whose career has been nothing but a series of successes gained without any great effort on his part. We should feel the same thing in looking back upon our own life if it had been all smooth sailing. Pain, anxiety, and effort are thus the

indispensable salt of life. This is the basis of James' dissatisfaction with life at the Chautauqua Lake Assembly, as described in the third of his *Talks to Students on Life* (in *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 268-274). Cf. also Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, pp. 259-264. Professor Hilty, a man of wide experience, who has had a great deal of success even in the ordinary acceptation of that term, summarizes his conclusions on this subject as follows: "The happiness which is sought in freedom from care is an ideal for those only who have never had the experience of such freedom. For the fact is that through our cares when not excessive, and through our victory over care, comes the most essential part of human happiness. Cares of a reasonable nature do not constitute what we call care. Many a life of the wildest experience would testify that the most unendurable experience is to be found, not in a series of stormy days, but in a series of cloudless ones" (*Happiness*, Eng. tr. p. 104).

2. These phrases designate, at bottom, two things: Such emotions as melancholy and fear, on the one hand, and *ennui*, the state of being bored, on the other. You can get the last when waiting for a train at a junction in a miserable little station, no other persons about, nothing in sight but a barren, uninteresting waste, no books or papers to read, and no thoughts to think. It reaches its climax in the solitary confinement of prisoners without labor, and then usually ends in insanity. This feeling of tedium cannot be successfully combated by a round of amusements, because amusements too constantly pursued pall on the taste. Even if not pursued too continuously, amusements that do not alternate with good, vigorous work seem to lack zest. Cf. Hilty, *Happiness*, p. 21: "Only he who works knows what enjoyment and refreshment are. Rest which does not follow work is like eating without appetite."

3. An immense amount of testimony can be offered on this subject. "Good work is the safeguard of personal health. I firmly believe one-half of the confirmed invalids of the day could be cured of their maladies if they were compelled to lead busy and active lives and had no time to fret over their miseries" (Dr. Mortimer Granville—an eminent English physician—quoted by Lecky, *Map of Life*, p. 18). The following has been often quoted: "When Charles Lamb was released for life

from his daily drudgery of deskwork at the India office, he felt himself the happiest of men. 'I would not go back to my prison,' he said to a friend, 'ten years longer for ten thousand pounds.' He also wrote in the same ecstatic mood to Bernard Barton: 'I have scarce steadiness of head to compose a letter; I am free, free as air. I will live another fifty years . . . would I could sell you some of my leisure. Positively the best thing a man can do is—Nothing; and next to that, perhaps, Good Works.' Two years—two long and tedious years—passed; and Charles Lamb's feelings had undergone an entire change. He now discovered that official, even humdrum work, had been good for him, though he knew it not. To Bernard Barton he again wrote: 'I assure you, *no* work is worse than overwork; the mind preys on itself—the most unwholesome of food. I have ceased to care for almost anything. . . . Never did the waters of heaven pour down upon a forlorn head. What I can do, and overdo, is to walk. I am a sanguinary murderer of time.'" (Smiles, *Character*, p. 113.) This is not an exceptional experience. The chapter in *Character*, from which this is taken, (Ch. IV) contains a great many others. Another set will be found in Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, Hill's edition, Vol. II, p. 386 and Note 3. Even self-imposed activities do not seem to answer entirely unless we take upon ourselves work which involves some responsibility to others so that we practically have to do it, whatever our temporary inclination may be. Thus one of the wealthiest young women in the United States, unmarried, whose sister manages the housekeeping, said to a friend of mine: "I wish I had to earn my own living." Yet she is a woman who leads a decidedly active life. It must have been a similar reason that led Edward Fitzgerald, the translator of Omar Khayyam, to write in a letter to a friend: "There is no happiness without some settled plan of action, and I have been all my life apprenticed to this heavy business of idleness" (Benson, *Life of Fitzgerald*, p. 180). He had wealth and never worked at a profession or business. But he had intellectual tastes, was a great reader, and wrote a good deal. Nevertheless it seems not to have satisfied him.

4. Examples are: Young women who teach school, often leaving their homes to do so, although they are not compelled

to support themselves, and in many cases their parents bitterly oppose their doing it. Explorers and mountain climbers, although here other factors enter, illustrate the same principle. Consult daily papers for an account of the hardships suffered by the members of the Antarctic exploring expedition that has recently (May, 1909) returned to England. See the account of the ascent of Mt. Huascaran, given by Miss Peck in *Harper's Magazine* for January, 1909. All these people will do the same sort of thing again, and not merely the leaders of the expedition, who gain fame and perhaps advancement, but also the rank and file who can hope to gain nothing outside of the experience itself.

5. The answer to this question is given by some very obvious reflections on the following well-known lines of Gray:

See the wretch who long has toss't
On the thorny bed of pain,
At length repair his vigour lost
And breathe and walk again;
The meanest floweret of the vale,
The simplest note that swells the gale,
The common sun, the air, the skies,
To him are opening Paradise.

Such feelings are not due merely to the fact that the dulling effects of familiarity have had a chance to disappear, so that things appear once more in their native attractiveness. The chief explanation is to be found in the exhilarating sense of escape from *realized* suffering. The mere awareness that we are not suffering from any of the countless diseases which might be assailing us, is incapable of giving us positive joy. But when the pain, or the threatened loss, or the fear, is still fresh in our minds, the consciousness of escape may produce an emotion of joy possessing great intensity. That the essential thing is an awakened imagination is shown by the fact that we sometimes get the same feeling in the presence of the misfortunes of others. The realization of what they are suffering brings home to us our own good fortune in not being similarly afflicted. Since under ordinary circumstances the imagination will not work vigorously enough to produce a lively sense of our good fortune in our freedom from suffering or other evils, this sense of good fortune cannot be made

an important factor on the positive side of the ledger. We should cultivate it, however, as much as we can.

6. The bearing of care and drudgery is made much easier by habit, while habit does not seem to have any such influence on hypochondria and *ennui*. Why this should be true may be hard to discover, but the broad fact seems to be proved by the difference in the way in which people endure them. Perhaps the reason for the difference is that the latter type of person is most apt to be what is called a pleasure seeker, *i. e.*, a person who seeks chiefly the pleasures of sense and amusement. Since, as Paley has shown, he is attempting the impossible, he is perpetually rebellious and discontented. At the same time he is bound by the chains of laziness—the most insidious of diseases—and hence finds it almost impossible to escape even when he recognizes the folly of his mode of life.

7. If an answer to this question is needed, it may be found in Walter Wyckoff's description of his experience as a day laborer at West Point, which will be found in *The Workers*, Vol. I; *The East*, p. 37 and ff. Some of this is quoted in James *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 285-287; the whole will also be found in *Scribner's Magazine*, Vol. XXII:282.

Pain, anxiety, or fear of any sort, are not desirable for their own sake. Habit, indeed, makes them easier to bear, but has no power to transform their nature. They may furthermore save us from worse evils, but that does not make them desirable in themselves. It is also true that they are the necessary means to the attainment of some of the best things in life, not merely "success" in its conventional sense, not merely wealth, knowledge, and skill, but also the consciousness of achievement, of victory over inner and outer obstacles. When we look at them in this way their aspect necessarily becomes more friendly, but even so their value is a derived one, and is not anything belonging to them in their own right; and where they form the greater part of the content of any life, and where through the want of any generous aim or high ambition, they do not give birth to this sense of achievement or victory, they can only be counted as among the major evils of life. It is necessary to say this as a protection against the exaggerated statements of certain philosophers and men of letters.

I: 3 On Happiness as Consisting in Superiority to Others
Questions for the Class

1. What is meant in the second paragraph of this section by superiority? Does it mean merely superiority in social position? 2. What is meant by "the pursuits of ambition" in paragraph 7? 3. Paley's statements in this section are reducible to two assertions. What are they? 4. Show why the pleasure of success is shortlived (see paragraph 7). 5. Show that the answer to 4 gives the explanation of the fact stated in the last sentence of paragraph 2. 6. Is it true that the pains of inferiority are equally shortlived? Give your reasons for your answer. 7. What is the testimony (a) of observation and (b) of history as to the truth of the statement in paragraph 7: "We soon cease to look back. . . . the pleasure with the pursuit is at an end?" 8. Is all inferiority painful? Why? The reasons will be found in the answers to the following questions: (a) Why do most of us not feel painfully our inferiority to Grant, the general, Tennyson, the poet, or Sargent, the painter? (b) Why—presumably—does not even the ablest statesman in an absolute monarchy—as in Russia till recently—feel painfully his inferiority in power and station to the monarch? 9. Apply the conclusions thus far reached to determining whether Paley's statements in paragraph 2 are true or not. 10. Apply them similarly to Paley's statement in paragraph 7: "But whether the pursuits of ambition be ever wise. . . . we may be allowed to entertain great doubt." 11. Test Paley's assertions on this subject by applying them to school honors—athletic, "social," forensic, literary, and (if they are accounted such in your set) scholastic. In case Paley's assertions, which are intended to apply primarily to the larger world where adults live, do not seem to hold completely for school life, what may the reason be? 12. What is the price that must ordinarily be paid for success in reaching the very top. (I am speaking of success obtained solely by the use of honorable means)? 13. Is there in the pursuit of success, as thus far defined, anything that is repellent to the generous nature? 14. Is there a kind of ambition not open to the objections suggested in 13? 15. Which of these two forms of ambition is more likely to be accompanied by enjoyment in the work itself. 16. Can a person be entirely

happy who does not desire some kind of success, and who does not in some measure attain it? Answer this question with Paley's doctrine in I:2 and II:2 before you. 17. In view of the fact that the pain of disappointed ambition (in the first sense of the word) is probably far greater than the joy of success, is beyond question far more longlived, and is far more likely to come to any given person than the corresponding joy, what limits should a person attempt to set to his ambition if he finds himself so constituted that without success in this sense he will be utterly and irremediably unhappy? 18. How can a person who wishes to rid himself, as far as possible, of the first form of ambition set about to lessen its hold upon him? 19. Ex-president Eliot of Harvard, in an article in the *World's Work*, Vol. 8 (1904) p. 4959, criticises the trade unions for attempting to eliminate all competition among the workmen themselves. Looking at the problem solely from the point of view of the welfare of the workman, and supposing that the average of wages remains the same in either case, what is your opinion of this criticism? If interested in this subject, apply your conclusions to the communistic doctrines of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.

Notes for the Teacher

1. In writing this paragraph, Paley was evidently thinking primarily of social superiority (so-called). His position is that happiness is not to be found where in an aristocracy, like England, men and women are likely to seek it, namely, in being a member of the highest social class. But during the discussion his mind passes to the consideration of other forms of superiority. This is especially the case in the last sentence of the paragraph. Here he means that no form of inferiority is in itself a source of unhappiness unless you pit yourself to succeed in that particular line, and accordingly that no form of superiority can give happiness unless you have obtained it by your own exertions.

2. By "the pursuits of ambition" is meant the attempt to get ahead of others in the race for wealth, power, or anything else which can be an object of competition among men, where the end in view is primarily coming in first.

3. The first is: No superiority is valued except superiority over a rival. The second is: Whether the pursuit of superiority is ever wise is very doubtful.

4. It arises only when we are comparing what we have or are with what we formerly had or were, or with what others have or are. This, as we saw in I:2, is something that is difficult to keep up for any length of time after the new situation has lost its freshness. Our past limitations and inferiorities naturally tend to lapse from memory. And since there is no practical necessity of keeping before our attention our own past, or the inferior state of other persons, all thought of them before long drops from the mind. Thus one's present status comes to be taken as a matter of course.

5. It follows from the preceding that where superiority to others is something we have been used to all our lives, we are quite incapable of realizing what its absence would mean, and accordingly its possession can give us little positive happiness. Similarly a man who has never had a sick day in his life seldom stops to congratulate himself upon the fact, and since he cannot realize what he is escaping, never can feel any great amount of joy at the fact even when for a moment, now and then, his attention is called to it.

6. The teacher in criticising a student's theme is far more apt to dwell upon the defects than the excellences, because the former alone call for action. So where there once arises a painful sense of inferiority, this feeling tends to persist, because the activities which it sets going in order to remove the inferiority keep the fact of inferiority constantly before the mind.

7. (b) The stock illustrations—and they are excellent ones—are Alexander the Great, sighing for more worlds to conquer, and Napoleon, whose ambition grew by what it fed on till his career was brought to an end by superior force.

8. There is an immense difference between people in this respect, and much depends on the nature of the inferiority. But as far as social, political, or professional rank is concerned, it is broadly speaking true that we are not mortified by inferiority where it has never seriously occurred to us to compete. Just as we are not mortified at inability to win a race for which we never entered. The teacher can work out the

details with the class as far as the latter find it interesting and profitable. The point is that, taking human society as a whole, inferiority is not in itself one of the principal sources of human suffering. And many who do suffer from it could rid themselves of their pain by turning their attention in other directions by an exercise of will power. It must be noted that in this section superiority and inferiority in wealth are not in question except for the sentimental value of wealth, i. e., its value as a sign of power or of having gotten ahead of the other fellow.

11. If there is any difference between school honors and those of the outside world, it is due to the fact that the champion in the former case is compelled to keep constantly at work in order to maintain his superiority. If the boy who does not go in for honors of any kind, and could not get them if he did, is sometimes made to feel his inferiority rather continuously, this is because in the restricted society of the school he is never able to get away from the fact of his inferiority, is not allowed by his companions to forget it for a moment.

12. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the price of very exceptional eminence in the business or professional world is the sacrifice of everything else. Jay Gould wrecked his health and Mr. John D. Rockefeller and Mr. Harriman have partially done so in their struggle to get to the top. Most of the very "successful" business men have turned their backs upon everything of interest or value that life has to offer outside of their business itself, and thus have become essentially poor men, i. e., poor in the sources of happiness. A brilliant New York editor (Mr. Godkin), late of *The Evening Post*, has spoken of the intolerable dullness of a week-end party at the country home of such men. Beyond the movements of stocks and perhaps fishing exploits, they had nothing to talk about, because they had killed off all other interests.

13. The attempt to find happiness in what you must suppose to be the unhappiness of others—for if you believe the sense of superiority will give you joy, you must suppose that the sense of inferiority will give those whom you have passed in the race, sorrow—the attempt to build the little structure of your individual happiness upon the broad foundations of

the unhappiness of many others is certainly not an aim that can appeal as wholly satisfactory to a generous nature.

14. There are two kinds of ambition. They are—in the words of Francis Bacon—the love of excellence and the love of excelling. In practice they may lead to the same kinds of action, but the spirit of one is very different from that of the other. In the latter a man has his eyes solely on the other fellows, and is trying to pass them. In the former, he has before him an ideal of excellence which he is trying to reach regardless of what anyone else is doing. This ideal may be an ideal of skill, whether intellectual, artistic, or physical, of character, or of service to others. He who loves to excel is grieved or envious when any one approaches him in attainments. But the lover of excellence is desirous of having as many as possible of his fellowmen obtain it with him.

15. The mere love of excelling, "the ambition which desires, not to work, but to get the results of work as quickly as possible, is incompatible with content in work" (Hilty, *Happiness*, p. 93). We see this in school or college athletes who train merely to win, or the scholar who studies merely to get marks or prizes. The desire to attain excellence might conceivably lead to a similar slavery, but it seldom does so, because one ordinarily attempts to reach the highest excellence only in that field in which his tastes or interests are strongly developed.

16. The indispensable element in a happy life is systematic and continuous work. We must, therefore, have something to work for, whether it be getting ahead of our rivals, or the attainment of personal excellence for its own sake, or service. And serious failure in either career will inevitably bring disappointment. Thus Hamerton, *Quest of Happiness*, p. xviii, is quoted as saying that the element which was lacking for complete happiness in his own life was success in work. Similarly President Eliot of Harvard, in the article quoted below, says that the most important element in happiness is the sense of efficiency.

17. He should attempt to limit his ambition to being among the leaders of those with whom he comes into daily or at least frequent contact.

18. (a) He must develop the spirit which will make it impossible for him to seek his own happiness by trampling upon his fellows. (b) He must realize that at best he will never reach an equality with the greatest (all of whom, by the way, had their limitations also), the Lincolns, the Darwins and the Shakespeares, and that such men could, if they chose, look down upon his attainments with the same feelings with which he looks down upon those beneath him, so that pride in the thought that one has passed others in the race has a purely relative basis. (c) He should cultivate the love of excellence, especially of good work, for its own sake.

19. President Eliot is criticizing, from the point of view of the welfare of the workingmen themselves, the attempt to eliminate all ambition of the first sort from daily work by eliminating the prizes which are the signs of success. I believe that if you succeed in getting a definite picture in your minds of what such an elimination would mean, or if you realize what society in Bellamy's Utopia would be like, you will feel that something has been lost that is well worth having. If ambition in the first sense were uprooted absolutely, there could be no such thing as games of any sort, and it would only impoverish life if the sources of enjoyment which loom so large in games were to be totally removed from our work. My own conclusion is, therefore, (I am not sure whether it would be Paley's) that the spirit of rivalry may play a subordinate part in a happy life, like amusements and the pleasures of sense, but that if it be once allowed to become all-absorbing, it is as dangerous to peace of mind and to richness of life as it is unlovely to contemplate.

CHAPTER III—HEALTH

We now turn from the criticism of popular delusions to the study of the positive contents of a happy life. We shall take up first the sense of well-being that comes from perfect health and abounding physical vitality, and the depression that follows upon their absence.

Modern discoveries in physiology and pathology have only served to make the truth of Paley's statements on this subject more certain and their significance more impressive. Everyone realizes the seriousness of acute disease. But what is constantly ignored or forgotten, and what is sometimes unknown, is that the feeling of dissatisfaction with life, or its extreme form, melancholy, is an inevitable accompaniment, not merely of the great majority of diseases, but also of all forms of impaired bodily vitality, whatever their nature and whatever their cause. Among the most widespread of the diseases which may produce depression are anaemia, the diseases of imperfect digestion, of imperfect excretion in their various forms, and most nervous diseases. The influence upon the spirits of imperfect excretion has given rise to the old joke: Is life worth living? It depends upon the liver.

What appear to have been diseases of the digestive organs have poisoned many lives which, because of a unique combination of outer success and inner resources, should have been among the most happy conceivable. One of the best known instances of this is Thomas Carlyle. From the time he was twenty-four till he was nearly sixty he suffered with acute indigestion which not merely at times produced intense pain, but which threw over his life for this entire period a black pall of melancholy. Says one of his biographers, John Nichol, (*Thomas Carlyle*, p. 158): "The melancholy, 'often as of deep misery frozen torpid' that runs through his writing, that makes him forecast death in life, and paint the springs of nature in winter lure, the 'hoarse sea,' the 'bleared skies,' the sunsets 'beautiful and brief and wae (sad)' compels our compassion in a manner quite different from the pictures of Sterne and other color dramatists, because we feel it is as genuine as the melancholy of Burns 'Look up there' said Leigh Hunt, pointing to the starry skies, 'look at that glorious

harmony that sings with infinite voices an eternal song of hope in the soul of man.' 'Eh, it's a sair sicht' [sad sight] was the reply." At the height of his success (1840, aged forty-five) Carlyle wrote: "I shall never be other than ill, wearied, sick-hearted. . . . bilious, heartless, and forlorn." "A huge nightmare of indigestion, insomnia, and fits of black impatience with myself and others,—self chiefly—" (1847). "Although beginning 'Frederick the Great' he is glad to get home to a *slighter* measure of dyspepsia, inertia, and other heaviness, ineptitude, and gloom" (1852). His biographer Froude writes as follows: "One asks with wonder why he found existence so intolerable He was now successful far beyond his hopes. The fashionable world admired and flattered him. The cleverest men had recognized his genius, and accepted him as their equal or superior. He was listened to with respect by all; and, far more valuable to him, he was believed in by a fast increasing circle as a dear and honored teacher. His money anxieties were over. . . . Why could not Carlyle, with fame and honor and heaps of friends, and the gates of a great career thrown open before him, and a great intellect and a conscience untroubled by a single act which he need regret, bear and forget too? Why, indeed! The only answer is that Carlyle is Carlyle." So much for the biographer. But Carlyle himself knew better: "I declare solemnly without exaggeration that I impute nine-tenths of my present wretchedness, and rather more than nine-tenths of all my faults, to this infernal disorder in the stomach." In view of this statement of Carlyle's, of whose substantial truth there can be no doubt, it is no wonder that DeQuincey, who suffered in the same way from the same causes, should write as follows: "The whole process and elaborate machinery of digestion are felt to be mean and humiliating when viewed in relation to our mere animal economy. But they rise into dignity, and assert their own supreme importance, when they are studied from another station, viz., in relation to the intellect and temper. No man dares then to despise them. It is then seen that these functions of the human system form the essential basis upon which the strength and health of our higher nature repose, and that upon these functions chiefly the genial happiness of life is dependent. All the rules of prudence, or gifts

of experience that life can accumulate, will never do as much for human comfort and welfare, as would be done by a stricter attention, and a wiser science, directed to the digestive system." *

In the case of Carlyle, the symptoms were so definite that he could not doubt for a moment the existence of disease. But where the failure of the organs to do their work is less marked, the depression may appear without being attributed by the victim to physical causes. Amiel is an example. He was a professor of philosophy at Geneva, who died some twenty years ago, and left behind him a *Journal Intime* which has been widely read and greatly admired. The book has a markedly pessimistic tone throughout. Amiel says that a wave of gloom came over him every day after dinner, and, after reaching its height by the middle of the afternoon, gradually passed away. No physician would have been in doubt for a moment as to the source of the "wave."

The intimate relation between low spirits and sickness is not accidental. The former is the natural effect of the latter and is due to the fact that disease lowers the vitality of the body. Lowered vitality in its turn produces depression of spirits. There are, it is true, some exceptions to this connection between low spirits and disease. But they are rare, and are due to causes not yet understood. The truth of the general principle is brought out impressively in the article *Melancholia* in that standard work, Hack Tuke's *Dictionary of Psychological Medicine*, Vol. II, p. 790 and ff. It must be premised that no disease affecting the mind in any way whatever is due to the appearance upon the scene of some entirely new factor not present in health. It is rather the result of too much activity on the part of one organ or set of cells in the brain, or of too little on the part of another. The difference, therefore, between ordinary low spirits and the disease of melancholia is only a matter of degree and not of kind.

*The above quotations, with the exception of the first, are from *Biographic Clinics* (First Series) by George M. Gould, M. D. It is his opinion that the disorders of the stomach, from which Carlyle, DeQuincey and many other eminent men suffered, were due directly to eyestrain. Most of the experts appear to believe that there is a great deal of truth in this contention. But whatever the nature of the ultimate cause of their maladies may have been, the broad fact remains that the gloom which overspread their lives was due to a failure of certain of the bodily organs to function properly.

The disease melancholia, the author of the article explains, has three principal symptoms, which always appear together, "a feeling of misery which is in excess of what is justified by the circumstances in which the individual is placed;" loss of energy, and defective nutrition and other bodily processes. The cause of one must, therefore, be the cause of all. The nature of this cause is indicated by the nature of its effects. "The characteristic alteration of conduct is its diminished activity. The characteristic alteration of the nutritive processes is their diminished activity. The characteristic alteration of consciousness is the diminution of the feeling of well-being; and we now know enough of the nervous accompaniment of consciousness to know that the feeling of wellbeing is dependent for its existence on a high state of activity of the nerve tissue, on a high degree of tension of the nerve energy existing therein. But a high degree of activity of the nerve elements produces great activity of conduct; and a high tension of nervous energy produces great activity of all the nutritive processes. Hence, when feeling is depressed, conduct diminished, and nutritive processes inactive, we must infer that the opposite conditions exist—that the nervous elements are unduly inactive, and the tension of the nervous energy is reduced below the normal."

It is less easy to prove that perfect health is normally accompanied by positive joy in living, because, for one reason, the existence of perfect health is doubtless today very rare (whatever it may become in the future), and its existence is hard to demonstrate in any particular case. It is easy to show, however, that this state of the feelings can be produced by physical causes. It can be produced, for one thing, by breathing pure oxygen. It also appears in the first stages of intoxication by alcohol, opium, and haschisch. "Under the influence of haschisch" says Moreau, who has studied it so well, 'the feeling which is experienced is one of happiness. I mean by this a state which has nothing in common with purely sensual pleasure. It is not the pleasure of the glutton or the drunkard, but is much more comparable to the joy of the miser, or that caused by good news.' I once knew well a man who for ten years constantly took haschisch in large doses; he withstood the drug better than might be expected, and finally died

insane. I received his oral and written confidences, often to a greater extent than I desired. During this long period I have often noted his feeling of inexhaustible satisfaction, translated now and again into strange inventions or commonplace reflections, but in his opinion invaluable." (Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, Eng. tr., p. 8). Other forms, not the result of borrowing from the resources of the body at frightful rates of interest, are the feelings of well-being which, in the person of average strength and vigor, follow bodily exercise. This need not be due to the fact that one has been having a good time, for the results—though not in the same degree—can be obtained from work with the chest weights. The feeling may be very intense, as the present writer can testify from his experiences in high mountain climbing. After a bath and after the disappearance of the feeling of fatigue, there may arise an intense feeling of pure joy in existence, which one who has experienced will never forget.

If, therefore, we wish to get the joy in which, according to Stevenson, lies the sense of action, we must avoid not merely disease in the ordinary sense of the term, but also dissipation, overwork, insufficient sleep, and everything else that tends to lower the vitality of the body; and we must—except in the presence of imperative duties—stick at all costs to the simple regimen of proper alternations of work and play, of exercise and rest, simple food eaten deliberately, fresh air, and cleanliness, which is the basis of abounding physical vigor.

But the presence or absence of physical vigor affects happiness in other ways beside the direct one thus far described. With lessened vitality, as was pointed out in the quotation from Hack Tuke, above, there goes inevitably the feeling of lassitude, and work becomes disagreeable, or in extreme cases, a burden that seems absolutely intolerable. Yet work for most of us is a necessity whether we like it or not, and for everyone, as we have seen, is a protection against the most serious evils. Thus lowered vitality makes the working hours of the day doubly cursed. In a precisely similar way abounding vitality makes every hour of activity, whether in work or play, doubly blessed, for, with high spirits and the vitality which is their source, there goes a positive craving for action,

and that not merely aimless activity, but for the overcoming of difficulties and the winning of victories.

Another ill effect of depressed vitality must be mentioned. It tends—we see this most clearly in the case of the sick—to impair the mental vision, *i. e.*, to prevent us from seeing things as they are, and to undermine the moral character, producing oftentimes cowardice, selfishness, and surrender to the tyranny of the moment. A striking illustration of moral deterioration due to brain fag is given by Dr. Gulick in the *World's Work*, 14:9345.

Health is partly a matter of heredity, partly a matter of our own care of ourselves. We suffer from the sins and weaknesses of our ancestors, as well as from our own indifference, imprudence, neglect, and weakness. Similarly, the way in which we live will affect not merely ourselves but our descendants. Accordingly, they who cannot, and they who will not, give their children this fundamental prerequisite of a happy life, a sound, strong physique, have no business to marry at all.

CHAPTER IV—FRIENDSHIP

SELECTIONS FROM THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, BOOKS VIII AND IX

The following selections are, for the most part, the translation of Dr. J. E. C. Welldon (*The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, The Macmillan Co. 1902.). Bk. VIII, Ch. IV, Par. 3, and Ch. VI, Par. 1, last part, are taken from the translation of Mr. W. M. Hatch. Bk. VIII, Ch. V, Par. 4, Ch. VI, Par. 1, first part, Pars. 2 and 3, and Ch. VII are not a direct translation, but are from the detailed summaries prefixed to the discussion of each chapter in Professor J. A. Stewart's *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*.

Book VIII, Chap. I. Friendship is indispensable to life. For nobody would choose to live without friends, although he were in possession of every other good. Nay, it seems that if people are rich and hold official and authoritative positions, they have the greatest need of friends; for what is the good of having this sort of prosperity if one is denied the opportunity of beneficence, which is never so freely or so admirably exercised as towards friends? Or how can it be maintained in safety and security without friends? For the greater a person's importance, the more liable it is to disaster. In poverty and other misfortunes, we regard our friends as our only refuge. Again, friends are helpful to us, when we are young, as guarding us from error, and when we are growing old, as taking care of us, and supplying such deficiencies of action as are the consequences of physical weakness, and when we are in the prime of life, as prompting us to noble actions, according to the adage "Two come together;" for two people have a greater power both of intelligence and of action than either of the two by himself.

Nor is friendship indispensable only; it is also noble. We praise people who are fond of their friends, and it is thought to be a noble thing to have many friends, and there are some people who hold that to be a friend is the same thing as to be a good man.

Chap. II. It is possible, I think, to elucidate the subject of friendship or love, by determining what it is that is lovable

or an object of love. For it seems that not everything is loved, but only that which is lovable, and that this is what is good or pleasant or useful.

There being three motives of friendship or love, it must be observed that we do not apply the term "friendship" or "love" to the affection felt for inanimate things. The reason is (1) that they are incapable of reciprocating affection, and (2) that we do not wish their good; for it would, I think, be ridiculous to wish the good, *e. g.*, of wine; if we wish it at all, it is only in the sense of wishing the wine to keep well, in the hope of enjoying it ourselves. But it is admitted that we ought to wish our friend's good for his sake, and not for our own. If we wish people good in this sense, we are called well-wishers, unless our good wishes are returned; such reciprocal well-wishing is called friendship or love.

But it is necessary, I think, to add, that the well-wishing must not be unknown. A person often wishes well to people whom he has not seen, but whom he supposes to be virtuous or useful; and it is possible that one of these persons may entertain the same feeling towards him. Such people then, it is clear, wish well to one another; but they cannot be properly called friends, as their disposition is unknown to each other. It follows that, if they are to be friends, they must be well-disposed to each other, and must wish each other's good from one of the motives which have been assigned, and that each of them must know the fact of the other's wishing him well.

Chap. III. But as the motives of friendship are specifically different, there will be a corresponding difference in the affections and friendships.

The kinds of friendship, therefore, will be three, being equal in number to the things which are lovable, or are objects of friendship or love, as every such object admits of a reciprocal affection between two persons, each of whom is aware of the other's love.

People who love each other wish each other's good in the point characteristic of their love [*i. e.*, they wish each other to be virtuous, or pleasant, or useful]. Accordingly those whose mutual love is based upon utility do not love each other for their own sakes, but only in so far as they derive some profit one from another. It is the same with those whose love is

based upon pleasure. Thus we are fond of witty people, not as possessing a certain character, but as being pleasant to ourselves. People, then, whose love is based upon utility, are moved to affection by a sense of their own profit, and people whose love is based upon pleasure, by a sense of their own pleasure; and they love a person not for being what he is in himself, but for being useful or pleasant to them. These friendships, then, are only friendships in an accidental sense; for the person is not loved as being what he is, but as being a source either of profit or of pleasure. Accordingly such friendships are easily dissolved, if the persons do not continue always the same; for they abandon their love if they cease to be pleasant or useful to each other. But utility and pleasure are not permanent qualities; they vary at different times. Accordingly the motive of the friendship being done away, the friendship itself is dissolved, as it was dependent upon that motive.

Chap. IV. The perfect friendship or love is the friendship or love of people who are good, and alike in virtue; for these people are alike in wishing each other's good, in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves. But it is people who wish the good of their friends for their friend's sake that are in the truest sense friends, as their friendship is the consequence of their own character, and is not an accident. Their friendship, therefore, continues as long as their virtue, and virtue is a permanent quality.

Again, each of them is good in an absolute sense, and good in relation to his friend. For good men are not only good in an absolute sense, but serve each other's interest. They are pleasant, too; for the good are pleasant in an absolute sense, and pleasant in relation to one another, as everybody finds pleasure in such actions as are proper to him, and the like, and all good people act alike or nearly alike.

Friendship of this kind we consider, with good reason, to be permanent, since it combines in itself all the characteristics which friends should have. Every friendship is based on goodness or on pleasure and implies a certain resemblance. Now in this perfect form all these requisites are present, and present, too, in virtue of the character of those concerned; in it we get resemblance between the friends and the remaining condi-

tions; to wit, absolute goodness and absolute pleasantness: these are the highest objects of affection; consequently, where these are, there will be love and friendship in their highest and best forms.

Friendships of this kind are likely to be rare; for such people are few. They require time and familiarity too; for, as the adage puts it, it is impossible for people to know one another until they have consumed the proverbial salt together; nor can people admit one another to friendship, or be friends at all, until each has been proved lovable and trustworthy to the other.

People who are quick to treat one another as friends, wish to be friends but are not so really, unless they are lovable and know each other to be lovable; for the wish to be friends may arise in a minute, but not friendship.

Chap. V. This friendship, then, is perfect. In point of time and in all other respects; and each friend receives from the other the same or nearly the same treatment in all respects, as ought to be the case.

For pleasure or profit, it is possible that even bad people may be friends one to another, and good people to bad, and one who is neither good nor bad to either; but it is clearly none but the good who can be friends for the friend's own sake, as bad people do not delight in one another unless some profit accrues.

It is only the friendship of the good which cannot be destroyed by calumnies. For it is not easy to believe what anyone says about a person whom we ourselves have tested for many years, and found to be good. The friendship of the good, too, realizes confidence, and the assurance that neither of the two friends will do injury to the other, and whatever else is implied in true friendship. But in other friendships there is no reason why calumnies and injuries should not occur.

It must be understood that we make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for utility, friends—(in the same way we speak of allied states as friendly states—utility is the bond of alliance between states): we also make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for pleasure, friends (as we speak of childish play-

mates as friends): it is only good men who love each other for their goodness who are friends in the primary and strict sense of the word. The other friendships are only metaphorically so called, because, while they are based on that which is good, it is not on that which is absolutely good, but on that which is only relatively good that they are based; for pleasant things are good only in relation to the man who takes pleasure in them.

Chap. VI. Just as we may look at the virtuous man either as 'having a virtuous disposition' or as 'acting virtuously,' so we may look at friends either as having the disposition of friendship, or as actively manifesting it. A and B may have constant opportunities of enjoying each other's society: C and D may live at a distance from each other and merely be so mutually disposed as to meet as friends when they do meet: for separation does not necessarily destroy the disposition of friendship, but may only prevent the active manifestation of the disposition. Still if the absence be prolonged, even the friendship itself may be forgotten, a fact which has given rise to the saying: Many are the friendships dissolved for want of intercourse.

Seeing much of each other and taking pleasure in each other's society is the great mark of friends. Hence old and morose people do not make friendships easily, because little pleasure is to be had from such people, and nobody cares to spend his days with people who are unpleasant.

Those who are on good terms, but do not see much of each other, are well-wishers rather than friends. Seeing much of each other, as we said, is the great mark of friends—whether they be those who depend on each other for assistance, or fortunate persons who love each other's society for its own sake. But people cannot see much of each other whose companionship is not mutually pleasant.

Chapter VII. As for stiff-tempered and elderly people—the more difficult they are to get on with, and the less pleasure they take in one another's society, the less likely is friendship to spring up between them: for nothing is so characteristic of friendship and so productive of it, as taking pleasure in one another's society: this is what young people do: and therefore they become friends quickly: but not so old people—nor stiff-

tempered people: nevertheless such people may be well disposed to one another (wishing one another good and helping one another in need); but they cannot properly be called friends, since they do not spend their time together or take pleasure in one another—thus failing to realize the two most characteristic traits of friendship.

To be a friend to many in the way of Perfect Friendship is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many at the same time: for Perfect Friendship is an exalted state of feeling, and, as such, has naturally one person as its object; also it is not easy for many to afford the highest satisfaction to the same person: not to mention the difficulty of finding many who are good: moreover, there cannot be perfect friendship unless the friends know each other well, and have come to enter familiarly into each other's dispositions—a hard thing to do where only two persons are concerned, and much harder where many are concerned.

Where, however, the object of friendship is utility or pleasure, it is possible to have many friends; for useful and pleasant people are numerous, and the services rendered are quickly rendered.

Chap. XV. Complaints and bickerings occur either exclusively or most frequently in friendship which depends upon utility, and it is reasonable that this should be so. For where the basis of friendship is virtue, friends are eager to do good to one another as a mark of virtue and friendship. Where their rivalry takes this form, there is no room for accusations or bickerings; for nobody takes it ill that a person loves him and treats him well; on the contrary, if he is a man of good feeling, he requites a kindness. Nor will the superior person find fault with his friend, as he obtains his desire; for in such a friendship, each of the friends desires the other's good.

Again such quarrelling hardly ever arises in a friendship of which pleasure is the motive; for both parties get what they long for, if it is their great pleasure to live together. But one of them would make himself ridiculous if he were to complain of the other for not giving him pleasure, when he might leave off living in his company.

It is such friendship as is based upon utility that gives rise to complaints; for as the parties in their dealings with each

other have an eye to profit, each of them always wants the larger share, and imagines himself to possess less than is his due, and complains of not obtaining all that he requires and deserves, when it is impossible for the benefactor to supply all that the recipient of the benefaction requires.

Book IX, Chap. III. If we admit a person to our friendship, believing him to be a good man, and he turns out and is seen to be a rascal, is it still our duty to love him? But love, it may be answered, is an impossibility under such circumstances, as it is not everything, but only the good that is lovable. A wicked person is not lovable, nor ought he to be loved; for it is not right for us to be lovers of the wicked; or to make ourselves like bad men; but it has been already said that like loves like.

Is it right in such circumstances to dissolve a friendship at once? Perhaps not in all cases, but only where the vice is incurable. If there is a possibility of reforming the friend who has gone wrong, it is a duty to help him in respect of his character even more than in respect of his property, inasmuch as character is a better thing than property, and enters more closely into friendship. It would be admitted that, if a person dissolves a friendship in these circumstances, his action is not at all unreasonable. He was not a friend of the person as that person is now, and therefore, if his friend has been metamorphosed, and it is impossible to restore him, he abandons the friendship.

Again, suppose A retains his original character, and B becomes more moral or vastly superior to A in virtue; is it right for B to treat A as a friend? It is impossible, I think, for him to treat him so. The case becomes clearest, if there is a wide discrepancy between the two friends. It may happen so in the friendships of boyhood; for if one of two friends remains a boy in mind, and the other is a fully developed man, how can they be friends, if they do not sympathize with each other in their tastes or in their pleasures and pains? There will be no personal sympathy between them, and without sympathy it is impossible, as we saw, to be friends, as it is impossible for two people to live together. But this is a point which has been already discussed.

Is it right then, when two friends cease to be sympathetic,

for one to treat the other as not being in any sense more an alien than if he had never become a friend? The answer seems to be that we must not forget the old intimacy, but as we think it a duty to gratify friends rather than strangers, so we ought to show some consideration for old friends in virtue of the past friendship, provided that the dissolution of friendship is not due to some extraordinary vice.

Chapter XI. It remains to ask, Is it in times of prosperity or in times of adversity that friends are more needed? We require them at both times; for in adversity we need assistance, and in prosperity we need people to live with and to do good to, as it is presumably our wish to do good.

Friendship then is more necessary in times of adversity; therefore in adversity we want friends to help us; but it is nobler in times of prosperity; therefore in times of prosperity we look for good people, as it is more desirable to do them services and to live in their society. For the mere presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity, as pain is alleviated by the sympathy of friends. Accordingly it may be doubted whether they take part of the burden as it were upon themselves, or it is rather the pleasure of their presence, and the thought of their sympathy, which diminishes the pain we feel.

We need not now discuss whether this or something else is the cause of the alleviation. It is clear, at all events, that the fact is as we state it. But it seems that the presence of friends is a source partly of comfort and partly of pain. There is a pleasure in the mere sight of friends, especially when one is in adversity, and something too of support against sorrow; for the look and voice of a friend are consoling to us if he be a person of tact, as he knows our character and the sources of our pleasure and pain. On the other hand, it is painful to perceive that a person is pained at our own adversity, as everybody avoids being a cause of pain to his friends. Accordingly people of a courageous nature shrink from involving their friends in their pain, and such a person, unless he be extraordinarily indifferent to pain, cannot endure the pain which he causes them, nor can he in any way put up with people whose sympathy takes the form of lamentation, as he is not fond of indulging in lamentation himself. It is only weak women and effeminate men who take delight in such people as display

their sympathy by their groans, and who love them as friends and sympathizers in their sorrow. But it is evident that we ought always to imitate one who is better than ourselves.

The presence of friends in seasons of prosperity is a pleasant means of passing the time, and not only so, but it suggests the idea that they take pleasure in our own goods. It would seem a duty then to be forward in inviting friends to share our good fortune, as there is a nobleness in conferring benefactions, but to be slow in inviting them to share our ill fortune, as it is a duty to give them as small a share of our evils as possible, whence the saying "Enough that I am wretched."

But the time when we should be the most ready to call them to our side is the time when it is probable that at the cost of but slight personal inconvenience they will have a chance of doing us a great service.

On the other hand, it is, I think, proper for us to go to our friends when they are in trouble, even if they do not send for us, and to make a point of going, especially to those who are in need and have made no claim upon us; for this is the nobler and pleasanter course for both. It is proper, too, to be forward in helping them to enjoy themselves, as this again is a service that friends may render, but to be less forward in seeking to get enjoyment for ourselves, as there is nothing noble in being forward to receive benefits. Still we must, I think, be on our guard against seeming churlish, as sometimes happens, in rejecting their services.

It appears then that the presence of friends is universally desirable.

Notes on the Text

Book VIII. Chapter I. By the word here translated "friendship" (*philia*) Aristotle means not merely friendship in the ordinary sense of the term, but all forms of friendly feeling, friendliness towards an acquaintance, affection for the friend in the true sense of the word friend, and family affection in its various forms.

The word translated "noble" means literally beautiful, and is most nearly equivalent to the English "praiseworthy," or "admirable."

Chapter II. The good is here the "beautiful," or that which calls forth admiration; the pleasant means, of course, that

which gives pleasure; the useful is that which is valued not for its own sake, but as a means to the attainment of the admirable or the pleasant, or of escape from the hateful or the painful.

Chapter IV. The language of this chapter may at first seem a little obscure, but the thought is entirely clear. The thesis which is maintained is that perfect friendship can exist only between perfectly good men. The reasons offered for this assertion are as follows: To be good is to be unselfish, and it is only the unselfish who are capable of that disinterested devotion which is the essence of friendship. Only the good man can love his friend for what he is in himself, for, at bottom, it is only goodness that really admires goodness. Again, only between good men can friendship be permanent, for the tried virtue of many years standing upon which it is based becomes finally an ingrained habit, and so a permanent characteristic of the man; therefore something that can be depended upon. Such friendship, furthermore, is useful and pleasurable to the friends, too. For the goodness of one friend will exhibit itself in actions useful to the other; and his actions and manner of life will be pleasant to the other, because in them the latter sees reflected as in a mirror those modes of conduct which he has chosen for himself, and which are, therefore, pleasing to him. Thus the tact, the thoughtfulness, and the kindness of the good man are a positive pleasure to watch, for one who loves these things, even when the spectator does not get any direction profit out of them himself.

These statements, however, do not exhaust Aristotle's thought. Perfect friendship, according to him, is possible only where there exists similarity of conduct and mind between the friends. And this similarity he finds in the friendships of good men. Each wishes for the other the same good that he wishes for himself, *i. e.*, perfection of character and of the whole personality. Each is useful to the other in the same way, *viz.*, in helping the other to make of himself a perfect man. Each is pleasant to the other in the same way, in that perfect human beings will choose what at bottom is the same sort of life and the same modes of action, and each will, therefore, have the pleasure of finding his likes and choices duplicated by those of his friend. This last position rests for

Aristotle upon the assumption that the highest type of man will devote his life to the discovery and contemplation of truth. It follows from what has preceded that the relationship between the two friends is one of perfect equality, since each gives to the other the same sort of thing that he receives from the other. And the humiliating feeling of inferiority is accordingly excluded.

Finally, in the friendship of good men, not merely is the relation an ideal one, but the related terms, namely: the friends, correspond to our ideal for humanity, because each is in himself good. This is brought out in the second paragraph. It is here declared that each of the friends is good in an absolute sense, *i. e.*, he is worthy of admiration in himself quite apart from his goodness in relation to his friend, that is to say, his usefulness. Furthermore the good, Aristotle holds, are pleasant or agreeable to themselves (this is what is meant by the phrase, "in an absolute sense"), *i. e.*, they have chosen the life which is not merely most worthy of admiration, but also that which affords the highest and best pleasures.

Thus friendship between men who are of the very highest character is an ideal one in every respect. "Everything is there: unselfish desire for another's happiness, the pleasure which is derived from one's own good conduct and from observing the good conduct of others, a mutual help in good works, and not least, the fact that the relation is permanent." This ideal may never have been fully realized on earth, but in proportion as friendship approaches it, it is the crowning good of life.

Chapter VI. The brave man cannot be acting bravely every minute, and days and weeks may pass when not a single opportunity for a brave action occurs. He is all this time, however, a brave man, if his ability to meet the test when the test comes has not disappeared. The same is true of the relation between friends. They may be absent from each other and thus all those actions which made up their friendship may from the necessity of the case be omitted.

"Fortunate persons" (in paragraph 3) are such as do not need the assistance of their friends, *e. g.*, the wealthy who are not in need of financial assistance or other help in their business. Such men seek each other's society for its own sake.

It is a favorite idea with Aristotle that the friendships of the old are based chiefly or solely on utility, and those of the young on pleasure. This position is based, not so much on observation, as upon certain assumptions derived from his general philosophy which lead him to conclude that the perfection of character upon which perfect friendship is based can exist only in middle life, the period when our physical and mental, and, as he assumed, our moral powers are at their height. In view of the way in which Aristotle reached this conclusion, it may be doubted whether his statements about the friendships of the old were any more applicable to the Greece of the fourth century B. C. than to the America of today.

Questions for the Class

1. Can you think of other reasons for valuing friendship than those here given? If you can, observe whether in the text which follows they have been anticipated in principle or not.
2. It is easy enough to see why we should congratulate a man who has many friends, but why should we praise him?
3. What are the two grounds on which, in Chapter I, Aristotle declares friendship to be valuable? Cf. Bacon's discussion of this subject in his *Essay on Friendship* (No. 27).
4. State the definition of friendship given in Chap. II.
5. Illustrate Aristotle's distinction (in Chap. III) between caring for a person because of his usefulness to you, because of the pleasure he may give you, and because you admire him. Does this throw any light upon the distinction between the acquaintance and the friend in the proper sense of the word friend?
6. Is this statement of the grounds for friendship complete, *i. e.*, if the ground upon which the third kind of friendship is based is admiration, can we not admire a person for other qualities besides his character?
7. Is it true that only those who possess a moral quality can admire it in others, *e. g.*, that only the brave admire courage.
8. Can you add anything to what Aristotle says about the importance of the moral element in friendship?
9. Is it true that admiration can by itself create friendship and keep it alive? Does Aristotle say it can?
10. Is it true that the good man is also useful to his friends and a pleasant companion?
11. Show that both parties to a genuine and permanent friendship must be good men.
12. If

Aristotle's general account of the basis of friendship is true, and the best friendships are possible only among the most highly developed persons, can a business man who slaves night and day in order to become rich, or, on the other hand, a mere idler have good friends and be a good friend? 13. Cicero, in his *Treatise on Friendship*, Chapter VI, asserts the existence of another condition of friendship, not yet explicitly mentioned. Friendship, he says, consists in "a perfect conformity of opinion on all religious and civil (social and political) subjects, united with the highest degree of mutual esteem and affection." Is this conformity of opinion absolutely essential to friendship? 14. Aristotle asserts that the third kind of friendship (that based on goodness) is necessarily permanent. Is this true? (a) Can it survive radical changes of opinion on the part of either friend? (b) the growth of one mind beyond the powers of the other? (c) the desire for novelty, for new minds to explore? 15. (Chap. V) Show that when evil reports circulate about a man of tried character, it will be those among his friends who are the best men who will be the last to believe them. 16. Can friendship survive the long continued separation of the friends? To answer this question get clearly before the mind the distinction between the friend and the well-wisher. 17. Is it true that in the friendships between the good "complaints and bickerings" are excluded? (Book VIII, Chap. XV) 18. If it takes time to create friendship, what is to be said of the advantages of friendships formed in youth? What are in general the advantages of such friendships? What are the disadvantages? 19. Can we apply these principles to true friendships between members of the same family? 20. Why is it that family affection or friendship is not more common? 21. Give a list of the minor causes in the way of mistakes in daily intercourse and of defects of character not yet enumerated which tend to destroy friendship and affection.

Notes for the Teacher

1. In connection with this question the students may be interested in the testimony as to the value of friendship given by two of the greatest modern students of human life, Francis Bacon and Goethe. For Bacon see the opening paragraph of

his *Essay on Friendship* (No. 27) and, indeed, the entire essay. Goethe in a letter to Frau von Stein (1781) says: "On this moving earth of ours the only sources of joy and peace are true love, the service of our fellows, and science (Wissenschaft, which is probably used here to mean both the intellectual and the aesthetic life)". One of the best students of life in our own generation—Philip Gilbert Hamerton—writes in the same strain (*Human Intercourse*, p. X): "The happiness of sympathetic human intercourse seems to me incomparably greater than any other pleasure. I may be supposed to have passed the age of enthusiastic illusions, yet I would at any time rather pass a week with a real friend in any place that afforded simple shelter than with an indifferent person in a palace. In saying this, I am thinking of real experiences. One of my friends who is devoted to archaeological excavations has often invited me to share his life in a hut or a cottage, and I have invariably found that the pleasure of his society far overbalanced the absence of luxury. On the other hand, I have sometimes endured extreme *ennui* at sumptuous feasts in richly appointed houses. The result of experience, in my case, has been to confirm a youthful conviction that the value of certain persons is not to be estimated by comparison with anything else."

For a delightful picture of the friendships of certain famous persons see Will H. Low in *Scridner's Magazine*, Vols. 43 and 44, especially those that treat of Robert Louis Stevenson.

2. The answer appears later in the fact that only a good man can be a true friend and can have true friends.

3. Friendship is (1) useful, so useful indeed as to be indispensable; and (2) it is noble or admirable.

5. An acquaintance is essentially either a person we like for reason 1 or 2 alone, or one whom we admire and respect for his own intrinsic qualities, but whom we have never associated with enough to have become intimate with.

6. It is not complete. And if Aristotle had been able to read the translation of his work which is here given, he would not have considered it an adequate representation of his views. The Greek word *arête*, which is by all translators rendered virtue, has a far wider meaning than the word virtue as used

in modern English. It means rather excellence of any sort, and is so used by Aristotle, as by his fellow Greeks, many times. In his discussion of friendship it stands for every form of personal excellence, strength and keenness and resourcefulness of intellect, breadth of interest, good taste, a happy companionable temperament, and good character, in short for every element of a well-rounded, completely developed personality. The highest happiness consists, according to Aristotle, in the completest and most harmonious development of all our powers and capacities. And it is in the union of men thus developed, who are attracted to each other primarily by admiration for each other's personal qualities, that true friendship consists. Among these qualities, character, as the argument shows, plays the most important part, but the philosopher who has just been devoting an entire book of his treatise (Book VI) to the excellences of intellect, could not for a moment forget or ignore the importance to friendship of other graces and admirable qualities beside the moral.

7. It is notorious that the cowardly may admire the brave, and in general those with weak will may admire those whose will is strong. Hamlet's address to Horatio illustrates this fact. Hamlet is one who tends to let himself drift, even in the most dangerous rapids. Yet he admires above all others the man who is one of those

"Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled
That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
To sound what stop she please."

But such cases are the exception rather than the rule. Usually if a man *really* admires a quality he will seek to embody it in his life, and usually he will have a sufficient measure of success so that the quality will appear in his conduct, however incompletely. And if he does not succeed, his admiration will ordinarily gradually atrophy. Where a man is very selfish, tricky, or habitually cowardly, you may therefore assume, in nine cases out of ten, that he does not really abhor these things and admire their opposite. In the tenth case he will, like Hamlet, be an unhappy man because he cannot attain what he admires. "Tell me what you like and I will tell you what you are," says Ruskin. We may add: Tell me what you are and I will tell you who likes you.

8. It is only to the intimate friend that we can reveal the secrets of our inner life, our aspirations and ambitions, the plans for life that really count, our sorrows, our deepest joys, our opinions on many subjects, our mistakes, our defeats, yes, and our evil deeds. But it is only with the thoroughly good man that such confidences are possible. He alone will not betray them either for gain, from pique, or from sheer indifference. He alone can sympathize with us perfectly, for he alone has the insight which reveals to him our point of view and the imagination with which to put himself in our place. He alone will not envy us our successes. The condition of such transparency on our part is, not that we shall have done no wrong, least of all have made no mistakes, but that we shall have done no wrong that is really shameful. This we should hardly be able to bring ourselves to confess, and wherever there is anything concealed, the medium that separates us is clouded. Then the more interests the two friends have in common, as interests in the success of their club, in the progress of medicine, in moral progress, in the beautification or good government of their city, etc., the more easy will it be to create and preserve the unity of aim and interest which is characteristic of friendship. When a man is nothing but a heap of petty egoisms, it is difficult for a friend to sympathize with them all, and it is precisely the man who has the rare talent of doing this that will be repelled by this pettiness, and that will refuse to form a friendship with its victim.

9. Aristotle does not suppose that friendship consists merely in the admiration of excellence. The discussions in Book VIII, Chap. IV, virtually, and that in Book IX, Chap. XII, explicitly recognize that friendship also involves identity of tastes. However, Aristotle is too ready to assume that those who are alike in the possession of highly developed personalities will necessarily have similar tastes, or at least a sufficient number of them to lead to the kind of companionship which deserves the name of friendship. The tendency is undoubtedly in that direction, but there must be many exceptions.

10. The man who is not merely of exceptionally high character, but also a highly developed allround personality, keen

to observe and to analyze, capacious and ready in memory, quick and certain in inference, of catholic, yet refined tastes, broad sympathies, a wide knowledge of life, obtained if not through observation, then through conversation and books, this man is precisely the most delightful of companions and the most useful of friends. He is precisely the man whom Aristotle has in mind as fulfilling his ideal of human excellence or *arété*. It will be found, however, that goodness is the foundation of all these good things, though it certainly is not the entire structure.

11. The point of this question is that it is absurd to suppose that you can have an ideal friend unless you are prepared to be such a friend yourself. "The only way to have a friend is to be one" says Emerson. The truth of this statement follows from what has been shown above.

12. Between poor, starved personalities only an inferior kind of friendship is possible. Accordingly if one's business is such that uninterrupted devotion to its demands narrows and impoverishes instead of educating, it will render him more and more incapable of its higher forms. Friendship, too, takes time to fashion, as Aristotle points out; and obviously a man who has time only to make money has no time to make friends. Furthermore a man whose entire energies are poured into his work, can have none left for his friendships. On the other hand, mere idlers do not make good friends, as the slightest observation shows. They are apt to be selfish, otherwise they would find something to do in a world in which there is much to be done. And if they were not selfish by nature, habit has made them lazy, and the lazy commonly end by being all eaten up with selfishness. They thus lack the first prerequisite for friendship. Furthermore, that which does perhaps more to cement friendship than anything else does not enter their lives, namely, common devotion to some end lying outside of themselves, as the devotion of the members of a football team to their team or their school, of patriots to their country, or of husband and wife to their children. On this see above, the answer to 8.

13. Whether Cicero's additional condition is an indispensable one is a very difficult thing to make any definite statement about. The never broken friendship of Carlyle and

Emerson, two men who differed in their views pretty radically, is one of the most delightful things in the history of men of letters. Carlyle and John Stuart Mill, diametrical opposites, were also friends for many years. Then differences in policies produced an estrangement. The most general statement we can make is that in proportion as incompatible opinions call for immediate action along mutually destructive lines, just in that degree is friendship difficult to maintain.

14. (a) The answer to this is given in part in the answer to the preceding question; in part it depends upon the extent to which the friend is capable of respecting in the other devotion to truth as that other person sees it, even though the vision is different from his own. If he adopts the common and convenient assumption that any divergence from his own opinions must be due to moral turpitude of some sort, he will find it hard to preserve the friendship. (b) Call no man a friend until his adoption is tried. Then the danger of your so far passing him morally that you can no longer feel as a friend to him is slight. It is, however, within the range of possibility. Where the tastes of one friend become far more refined than those of the other, the same result will follow. In the case of intellectual differences, it depends upon whether one person's mental life passes out of the sight of the other. If it is possible for each to converse profitably about those things which interest them most, friendship may remain even though all the instruction be on one side. In many cases, however, not even so much as this is necessary. Still, in all such cases, friendship suffers a decline from the ideal, even though it be far from annihilation. (c) This indicates a real danger to friendship, which must be met by forethought and some labor. "Nothing for nothing" is the law of life, for the really good things of life seldom come to us by chance, but rather by wisely directed work. The solution of this problem is continued intellectual growth. See Hamerton, *Intellectual Life*, Part VII, Ch. III.

15. Suspiciousness may be due to constitutional timidity, but it is usually due to the existence in ourselves of the faults which we suspect in others, it being difficult for us to realize that others may possess virtues which we lack. Hence the significance of the words of Bernard Shaw which have been al-

ready quoted: "You can not believe in honor until you have achieved it. Better keep yourself clean and bright: you are the window through which you must see the world."

16. A friend is one who knows and shares our life. Hence a long-continued companionship is essential to friendship. When it is once well established, however, visits, especially of some regularity, may serve perfectly in keeping it alive. A regular and full correspondence (such as the too lazy and the too busy, however, are never capable of), will have, in part, the same effect. Since "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," it might be worth while to see whether by making some sacrifices we could not live near our friends, that is, assuming that our friendships are worth making any sacrifices for.

17. If the friends were perfect, "complaints and bickerings" would be excluded. But it is the great danger of the highest form of friendship that, among imperfect beings, the very idealism upon which it is based may give rise to demands which the other person cannot meet, and to an amount of disappointment, perhaps of disgust, at the failure to do so, which would never have occurred if his standards had been lower. The attitude to take towards the faults of our friends is well shown by Dr. Gulick in the *World's Work* for July, 1908. Few, however, have the wisdom and self-control to act upon his advice.

18 and 19. The answers to these questions are in great part applications of principles that have been already brought to light.

20. Indifference or even dislike may be due in part to real incompatibility. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to see why unity of descent should be supposed to necessitate the existence of affection. More often, however, it is due to carelessness or bad manners. Where a number of men and women are together, it is unfortunately only too easy in a great many cases to tell who are husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, by the absence of the common courtesies that are rigorously observed everywhere else. Mark such persons, and, in general, do not offer them your friendship, if you attach any value to it. You will probably be casting pearls before swine.

21. A good list will be found in Sir Arthur Helps' *Friends*

in Council, First Series, Vol. I, Chapter VII, *On the Art of Living with Others*; Chap. IX, *Unreasonable Claims in Social Affections and Relations.*" See also page 255. Two of his more important statements on this subject are as follows: "If people are to live happily together, they must not fancy because they are thrown together now that all their lives have been exactly similar up to the present time, that they started exactly alike and that they are to be for the future of the same mind. A thorough conviction of the difference in men is the great thing to be assured of in social knowledge: it is to life what Newton's law is to astronomy. Sometimes men have a knowledge of it with regard to the world in general: they do not expect the outer world to agree with them in all points, but are vexed at not being able to drive their own tastes and opinions into those they live with. Diversities distress them. They will not see that there are many forms of virtue and wisdom. Yet we might as well say, 'Why all these stars; why this difference; why not all one star?'"

"Many of the rules for people living together in peace follow from the above. For instance, not to interfere unreasonably with others, not to ridicule their tastes, not to question and requestion their resolves, not to indulge in perpetual comment on their proceedings, and to delight in their having other pursuits than ours, are all based upon a thorough perception of the simple fact that they are not we." (From Vol. I, Ch. VII, pp. 103-104. Compare this insistence upon diversity with Aristotle's emphasis upon similarity).

"In speaking of criticism we must not omit to mention that there is a species of it which may be called needless, as distinguished from that which is intentionally unkind. It is a great mistake to suppose that because words are used logically and may be sensible enough in themselves, that they may, nevertheless, not come under the description of folly and be liable to all that Solomon has said against foolish talk. I believe that more breaches of friendship and love have been created, and more hatred cemented by needless criticism than by any other one thing. If you find a man who performs most of the relations of life dutifully, is even kind and affectionate, but who, you discover, is secretly disliked and feared by all his friends (sic?) and acquaintances, you will often, on further

investigation, ascertain that he is one who indulges largely in needless criticism." Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. II *On Giving and Taking Criticism*, p. 255.

CHAPTER V—WORK

THE QUEST OF HAPPINESS, BY PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON

Chapter X. *Happiness in Our Occupations.* There are three sources of happiness in professional occupations.

The first is the sense of harmony between the occupation and the mental condition of the person who follows it.

The second is the feeling of efficiency. This is always agreeable in itself, even when the occupation is not precisely congenial.

The third is the knowledge that the work we are engaged upon, whether agreeable in itself or not, will be rewarded by some benefit to ourselves or others of a nature extraneous to itself.

Of these three sources of happiness in our employments, the first (the sense of harmony) is the most attractive, especially in youth. It seems as if there could be no limit to our happiness when our occupation is precisely in harmony with our tastes.

As to the second (the consciousness of efficiency) it is obvious that it differs from the first in coming much later, as there cannot be any feeling of efficiency until it has been attained, and it cannot be attained in anything without great labor in actual practice, which involves a prolonged period of inefficiency.

The third source of happiness in occupations (the feeling that we are winning an extraneous benefit that has nothing to do with the occupation itself) is usually chosen by those who consider themselves, and are considered by others, eminent for their prudence and right reason. To follow an uncongenial occupation with a view to money requires a persistent exercise of will. An occupation so pursued is clearly differentiated from all pleasures. The exercise of will elevates it, and still more when the money earned by it is for others.

Now, with regard to the probability of disappointment, it is the desire for happiness in congeniality of occupation that most exposes us to disappointment, for reasons which are given later.

Satisfaction in efficiency appears at first so positive that it seems as if disappointment were not to be apprehended, as it is difficult to believe that even vanity itself could cherish illusions about efficiency when practice is sure to put it to frequent and incessantly recurring tests. A man must surely know whether he is practically a good swimmer and a good rider, or not; if not, his own misadventures will make him aware of it. The disappointment is usually that of hope long deferred and never ultimately realized. The inefficient person hopes that efficiency will come to him in time, with practice, and it does not come; he remains inefficient to the end. That is his form of disappointment. Efficiency itself, when attained, is not disappointing; it is a constant satisfaction. The accomplished person may feel vexed that his efficiency does not bring him extraneous honors and wealth, but that has nothing to do with the pleasure of feeling himself accomplished.

The third source of happiness in occupations as given above, is the avowed pursuit of an extraneous advantage by means which are possibly not agreeable in themselves, but of which the pleasantness, or the unpleasantness, is not taken into consideration. This way of pursuing happiness is greatly superior to the two others in the clear distinction that it establishes between the means that may have to be employed and the end that is steadily kept in view. It is admitted, from the beginning, that the means may be disagreeable, so there can be no disappointment about that; and as the best years of an ambitious man are mainly occupied in the pursuit of his objects, he may already enjoy a prospective happiness in the mere hope of their still distant attainment. His peculiar form of disappointment usually awaits him towards the close of his career, when the extraneous reward that he has received in the shape of honors or fortune is always likely to seem to him an inadequate payment for all that he has done, and an insufficient compensation for all that he has sacrificed. Or he may be disappointed in another way: the rewards may be even greater than he had anticipated, yet the pleasure of fruition as far inferior to his hopes. Nevertheless, whilst fully admitting these possibilities of disappointment, I believe that it is safer, as a rule, to seek for happiness in some reward outside of our occupations than in the occupations themselves; but these

questions are so important as to deserve fuller consideration than could be given to them conveniently in a single chapter.

Chapter XI. *Congeniality of Occupation.* Some experienced people hold the belief that although there may be very wide differences, as to pleasure, between studies or exercises that are undertaken for amusement only, all occupations followed as work are sure to be equally irksome, so that there is, in fact, no reason for choosing one professional occupation in preference to another as far as its inherent agreeableness may be concerned. According to this theory, congeniality of occupation is not worth considering by professional people, though it may be of importance to amateurs.

I have been in the habit of inquiring, in conversation with workmen, whether they felt any attachment to their occupations and took any pleasure in them, and I found that a kind of general law appeared to reveal itself in their answers. The more the occupation educated the workmen, the more nearly it approached to the nature of an art (not necessarily a fine art), the stronger was the disposition to become attached to it; whereas mere labor without any educating interest was only gone through with more or less courage and endurance. Thus joiners, as a rule, are attached to their profession, which is constructive and often calls for forethought and ingenuity, and the more difficult the work they have to do the better they seem to like it, provided only that they are not too strictly limited as to time. The materials, too, are interesting from the variety of their natures, and the necessity for treating each wood in a special manner, according to its own constitution. One joiner told me that the only objection he had to his work was that as he liked it, and was almost incessantly engaged upon it, the days and years flew past too quickly, so that his life was made shorter for him than it would have been in idleness.

Occupations are never, to those who follow them, what outside observers imagine them to be, and it would be impossible for us, even if we tried an occupation for a long time, to feel at home in it as a man does who has worked at it steadily since his boyhood. I lived at one time in what was both an agricultural and a mining district, and I remember with what surprise I discovered that the miners were at least as much at-

tached to their own occupation as the farmers were to theirs, though it seemed to me, with my love of landscape and fresh air, that to be much in the fields was to be poetical and delightful, reminding one of Virgil and Burns, whilst nothing could be more gloomy and depressing than the black and dangerous interior of a mine. Further study of the matter made it clear to me that what the miners liked in their occupation was a certain rough kind of cosiness and comfort, as they were perfectly independent of wind and weather, and their lamps and fires gave a sort of homelike feeling, especially in the depth of winter. Besides, the art of mining has always its own practical and scientific interest, which the miners themselves share with the engineers, whilst the personal danger is either made light of from familiarity, or stimulates, without daunting, the courage of brave men.

Chapter XII. *Insufficiency of Gifts.* The gifts required for some peculiar kind of happiness in occupations may be insufficient in one of two different ways—either they may be all present, but too weak, or some of them may be present in quite sufficient strength, whilst others, equally necessary to the kind of happiness desired, are entirely absent.

Amongst the gifts that are very common in a certain limited degree, but extremely rare in any eminent degree, is the power of sustained effort in doing what is felt to be drudgery. The consequence is that few men or women go long and steadily through work that requires drudgery unless they are forced to it and bound to it in some way, usually by pecuniary necessity. Young people, in dreaming about occupations that they fancy they would like, always omit the drudgery, but Nature never omits it; she inflicts it upon us even in those occupations that are supposed, by those who have never seriously followed them, to be purely and absolutely delightful. It may take very different disguises, but it is always in reality the same—that is, a business that has to be gone through with patience. Sometimes the victim has to feign enjoyment at the same time, as in many social functions, or he has to conceal his labor and assume an appearance of ease, as in many kinds of artistic performance and production—deceptions that really increase the drudgery which they disguise.

In the ideal anticipation, all drudgery is, of course, elim-

inated; in the reality, every occupation has its own peculiar drudgery. Mr. Holman Hunt says that the reason why so many amateurs fail in painting is that they shrink from the drudgery that it demands. The world in general believes that painting is always agreeable, always an amusement, an *art d'agrément*, as the French say. The intelligent young man who is bound down to a manual occupation thinks that scholarship must be delightful, and so indeed it is; but the delightfulness is associated with, or preceded by, a kind of drudgery harder than that of planing boards, because it requires a more incessant attention.

But the great reason why there is so much disappointment about the suitability of a particular occupation to one's natural talents is because we are so apt to believe that we have all the talents required for a particular kind of work, when in reality, we have only some of them. Those that we do possess may exist in great strength and perfection; when that is the case, we are all the more liable to be deceived into the belief that we possess also those other talents that are, in reality, wanting to us. Let us consider the various gifts that are all absolutely indispensable to the equipment of a great poet. I enumerate them, for a particular reason, in the inverse order of their importance.

1. The poetical appreciation of all that we observe; that is, a sense of the charm of nature and of human life, which is always emotional, and therefore different from the prosaic perception of hard fact. This sense is possessed in common by poets and all truly artistic painters. It must also belong to the romantic (as opposed to the scientific and analytic) novelists, and in a considerable degree to musical composers.

2. An exquisite sense of the beauty of language and of the literary value of words, accompanied by the power of selecting those which produce the most musical effect upon the ear, and of arranging them in new and beautiful combinations. This power is also possessed by artistic writers of prose, but they do not cultivate it to the same extent, as they have not the constant musical discipline of metre and rhyme.

3. The faculty of creative imagination, or, as it is sometimes called, poetic invention. This power exists in various degrees of strength. Milton had less of it than Dante, Dante

less than Shakespeare, but it is always present in poets of the first rank, and manifests itself even in their youth; for example, in the rich, though immature, poetry of Keats.

Of these three gifts, the first makes a mind responsive to poetry, and is therefore essentially the reader's gift. The sympathetic reader has all the feelings of a poet, and these feelings, which always answer so readily to the call of genius, may awaken in him an illusory creative impulse. He then tries to write poetry, fails, and is for a time discouraged and unhappy. Yet the bare reality of his situation, divested of all illusion, is very good. He is still a privileged person. He has possibilities of enjoyment that no critic, however contemptuous, can take away from him; he has the faculties that appreciate great poetry,—an appreciation which of all intellectual enjoyments is the most elevated, the most noble, whilst it is so little costly that it may be had in the highest perfection for a few pence.

When this gift is joined to the second (the mastery of language) but without creative imagination, the result is a minor poet; that is, a musical versifier who has poetical thoughts and feelings. Here, again, there is room for a mistaken estimate of one's own powers. The minor poet who constructs his verses skillfully, and has genuine feeling, may excusably attribute to himself the complete poetical equipment. The gift and the accomplishment that he possesses are of a high kind, though not of the highest. He, too, is an enviable personage, if he knew his own happiness, as in addition to the pleasure of reading poetry he enjoys the still more active pleasure of sound metrical composition. If poetry were like anything else, the minor bard might be thoroughly happy in his work, having the assurance that it was good of its own kind; but the contempt which is attached to all metrical writing except the highest (a contempt in great part due to disinclination to read any poetry whatever) places the minor poet in the position of a producer of something that is not wanted, and this is always trying to one's self-love.

Another art that easily awakens delusive hopes is that of painting. The desire to paint is excited in us by the love of nature, and especially by an admiration for those fleeting beauties that art may preserve, however imperfectly, still better

than Nature herself does. The first of these is that transient human beauty which in life is subject to so many changes. At a later period in the history of art, there comes a desire to preserve some record of the fleeting beauties of landscapes.

This is the true origin of painting. The ambition to win money and fame by means of art is extraneous, and arises later. It has nothing to do with the first impulse. Even after painting has become a recognized avenue to wealth and fame, an aspirant might still find wealth more easily attainable by commerce, and fame by literature or politics, so that the choice of painting would still, in most cases, be dictated by the love of nature; and we see that in reality it is so.

This brings us to the most common cause of disappointment in the pursuit of painting, which is the distinction between a love of nature and a feeling of satisfaction in the technical management of pigments.

Obviously, the love of nature may exist without any special pleasure in glazing or impasto, or any special aptitude for handling. It may even exist without any talent for composition or any gift of pictorial invention. We may go yet further, and say that the most keenly appreciative enjoyment of natural beauty at the moment of observing it may be utterly distinct from any power of remembering it, even for a day.

Confident in the sincerity of his love of nature (which is only an expression for the enjoyment of natural beauty or sublimity) a youth may go to painting because he wishes to express his feelings and thinks that painting would be the most effective means, not because he has the inborn abilities of a painter. In such a case an artistic disappointment will assuredly be the consequence of hoping for too much from a love of nature in a practical and productive sense. But that love itself remains to the disappointed artistic aspirant, and may still be a source of great happiness to him if he is only able to dissociate it from his artistic failure.

The author then proceeds to point out that even the enjoyment of the work of painting is no guarantee of any great degree of skill in the art. The result is that many of those who attempt to make painting their life work end in comparative or complete failure. He continues: Amongst obscure artists and authors the instances of disappointment which remain unknown

to us must be innumerable. The evil in their lives is the extreme difficulty of enjoying the practice of an art for itself alone, and without reference to the opinion of others. There is also, in most cases, the incessant intrusion of pecuniary considerations which have absolutely nothing whatever to do with the arts we practice, yet which force themselves on our attention because we all of us have to buy our time with money that must be either inherited, or earned, or stolen.

The best refuge, so far as happiness only is concerned, would be to cherish in ourselves, as much as possible and as long as possible, the true student-spirit, which takes an interest in a pursuit on its own account without reference to any personal success. I have just said that it is extremely difficult to enjoy the practice of an art for itself alone. It is so because the fine arts appeal to others and attempt to awaken their emotions, so that to write what is never to be printed or to paint what is never to be exhibited seems like talking to rocks and trees. But the study of nature is a pursuit that does not of necessity involve an appeal to the sympathy or admiration of any human being, and it is a safe refuge. It has been the one remaining happiness of many a disappointed artist; it is the delight of all obscure men of science; it makes us, so long as we are engaged in it, independent of the whole human world except our predecessors, who have prepared the way for us, and who, for the most part, were solitary students like ourselves.

Questions for the Class

1. Has Hamerton enumerated all the sources of happiness that may be found in our daily work? 2. Hamerton believes it is safer, as a rule, to seek for happiness in some reward outside of our occupation than in the occupation itself. In estimating the value of this advice, it must be remembered that Hamerton attempted to become a painter and failed; and that, on his own confession, this failure was the greatest disappointment of his life. With this fact in mind let us turn to the reasons which he gives for his opinion. They are stated in Chapter XII. (a) What are these reasons? (b) Why is failure in an occupation like painting or authorship more probable than in law or in carpentry? (c) Is Hamerton's ad-

vice, then, applicable indiscriminately to all occupations? (d) In reality, can it be applied to any? (e) As a matter of fact is direct pleasure in one's occupation particularly rare? Note what Hamerton himself says in Chapter XI. 3. In view of what Hamerton says and in view of your own observation, would you say that a liking for an occupation was sufficient evidence for enough ability in that field to obtain moderate success in it? In answering this question distinguish between the various reasons for which a person might feel attracted to a given occupation, as *e. g.*, the practice of law. 4. Where a person's chief interests lie in one direction and his greatest abilities in another, which should he follow in choosing his life work? (This question asks which is to be preferred, the gratifications of the tastes or the sense of efficiency; it does not raise the problem of the probable cash reward in the second case.) 5. How would you go about discovering whether your abilities fit you for one occupation rather than another? 6. If we find ourselves chained to some occupation which does not appeal to us as interesting, how can we make it so? 7. Can this be done in every occupation? Take the following as examples: keeping a small store, farming, the work of the motorman, domestic service. 8. All serious work in life involves a certain amount, usually a good deal, of drudgery. How can our natural aversion to drudgery be conquered or lessened?

Notes for the Teacher

1. Hamerton's first source of happiness includes love of the product or of the material in which we work for its own sake, as well as pleasure in the activities by which the product is created. His second includes satisfaction in the thought that *we* have done an admirable piece of work. In the third, "others," for the generous nature, will include all who will be profited by our good work. Thus where an employee is well treated, and where he is a man of any character whatever, he will rejoice in the success of his employers which is attained through his efforts; similarly the merchant, in supplying his customers with good wares. It is this latter, together with the second, that are the ingredients of pride in one's work, and there is no complete, allround pride, unless both these ele-

ments are present, as there is no complete happiness in work without pride in it. The element which Hamerton neglects is the satisfaction that a person may obtain in his work through the recognition that it is developing his powers. These powers may be either physical, intellectual, or moral. The more uninteresting the work in other respects, the more completely does it lead to the body and the mind becoming the servant of the will. So that the man with self-respect finds in his work a field for the development of reliability in matters great and small, self-control in all its forms, and loyalty to his part in the life of society. No one is really indifferent to the value of these things, and if he makes the effort to attain them in greater and greater completeness an element in the day's routine, he will be rewarded by a satisfaction which will not fail to enrich his life. Certain other sources of interest which are peculiar only to certain occupations may be pointed out by the teacher, but hardly concern the purposes of this course.

2. (a) Hamerton's argument is as follows: Since a person may be led by his tastes into an occupation for which he does not possess the requisite ability, and thus he may be lured into failure, therefore, he had better pay no attention to the call of his tastes. (b) Hamerton chose a profession for which not one person in ten thousand possesses the gifts necessary for even moderate success. The chances in favor of the lawyer or artisan succeeding are far greater because these kinds of ability are more plentiful. Therefore, the man who allows his tastes to lead him into these occupations takes a far smaller risk than does the painter. (c) Hamerton's advice, therefore, has precisely the greatest plausibility in that department of work in which he himself failed. For the occupations of most men his view will not hold; and for reasons discussed under (d) it really does not hold anywhere. The statement of Emerson still holds true: "The high prize of life, the crowning fortune of a man, is to be born with a bias for some pursuit which finds him in employment and happiness,—whether it be to make baskets, or broadswords, or canals, or statues, or songs." (*Conduct of Life,—Considerations by the Way*, p. 253). (d) No: for one might equally well argue that since some persons choose one occupation in preference to another because they think that in it they can make more money, and

yet such persons may die poor, therefore it is advisable to pay no attention to the comparative money value of the two pursuits. As a matter of fact, there is a chance for failure, whatever the end in view, and the only problem worth discussing is this: If of two men one chooses an occupation primarily to get money, the other because it appeals to his interests, and both are successful in getting what they started out for, which man's example shall we follow? While no general answer can be given to this question because everything depends upon the intensity of the love which the latter feels for his vocation, yet certain considerations ought to be kept in mind in deciding this question for one's self. The man who slaves all day in order that he may heap up the means of enjoyment for the evening, for Sundays, and for his vacation, is sacrificing the majority of his waking hours to the minority. Since fatigue is increased in amount not merely by the amount and intensity of our work, but also by lack of interest in the work itself, he is throwing a shadow over his hours of freedom that is absent from those of the other man; in the end, this is apt to blight to a greater or less degree all his hours of enjoyment. A person before the days of chloroform (and indeed since) would find it hard to have a "good time" on the eve of an operation. So, in a less degree, of course, the pleasure of an evening is apt to be dampened by the thought of the coming day's toil, if that is to be nothing but a mere grind. One thing more: High powers of self-control are so rare that the chances of a man's succeeding who does not love his work are very small; for all success costs work. (e) Pleasure in one's occupation is not rare. A friend who was engaged in the now famous Pittsburg Survey tells me the men in the steel mills enjoy their work until from the length of the hours and the demands made upon their strength they become physically fatigued. With proper hours they would find their daily work very enjoyable. The same was true, he said, of locomotive engineers. And from a recent statement made by a member of the guild, the same is true of many, perhaps most, motormen on the trolley cars, especially in the large cities. A census would probably show that the vast majority of men who put any kind of skill into their work enjoy it in proper amounts, except in so far as they lack physical vigor from fatigue, dis

sipation, or sickness. Those who do not, have allowed a listless spirit to grow upon them, chiefly through keeping their attention on the clock instead of pitching in and doing their work with all their might.

3. There are at least three reasons for preferring one occupation to another: (a) Interest in, or love for, the finished product, or in the material with which the occupation deals, *e. g.*, the delight of the painter either in nature or the completed painting because of its beauty; interest in machinery; in the physiology and anatomy of the human body. (b) Delight in the activities involved in the occupation for their own sake: pleasure in painting, in designing or making machinery, in the practice of medicine. (c) a desire for the extraneous rewards which the occupation brings in its train, as wealth, fame, or social position. As Hamerton shows (a) is not by itself sufficient evidence of the possession of ability in the corresponding field. However, it creates a certain presumption in that direction, and beyond question, if the interest is deep, it is a guarantee of the very important qualities of patience, industry, and the willingness to undergo drudgery. It is still more obvious that (c) is no evidence at all. And it is particularly important to keep this fact in mind in choosing an occupation, because thousands of men who might have been good artisans have had their lives ruined by their desire to become business men, or above all, lawyers, because of the supposed or actual superior "social standing" enjoyed by these occupations. And many a man who might have been a successful teacher has been lured, to his cost, into some other occupation which did not really appeal to his powers or his tastes, because it offered larger money prizes. See on this subject the vigorous language of Mathews' *Getting On in the World*, pp. 36-39. With regard to (b), however, the case is very different. With every real power there goes normally pleasure in its exercise, and, *ordinarily*, there is no pleasure in the activity unless at least a fair degree of efficiency is present, and the higher the efficiency, the greater the delight. This is, therefore, the best single test as to the nature and extent of our abilities that we possess.

4. No general answer can be made to this question, and it is inserted simply because some students will have to face it.

For example, one may have a taste for "scribbling," yet not possess enough ability to be anything more than a fourth-rate writer. Shall he persist in "scribbling," or shall he enter some less congenial occupation for which nature has given him a better equipment? So many different factors enter into every such case that each person must decide for himself. But the teacher can help the pupil by setting forth what is involved in each alternative, so that the boy may act with the entire situation before his eyes. Fortunately such cases are rare, the rule being that, as stated above, interest in an activity may be taken as a sign of ability in that direction, and that—though here there may be many exceptions—(a) and (b) go together also.

5. The average boy has to take such an occupation as he can get. The high school graduate has the world before him; because, even if he is poor, he can almost always in this country earn the money, if necessary, to take him through college and through a professional school. To him, then, the selection of an occupation which is congruent with his tastes and powers is a possibility, and he should choose with corresponding care. The best single indication of what he should do is that set forth in the answer to 3. But it is not the only one. The student should, therefore, consult men who have been successful in those occupations which he has under consideration and get them to give him as detailed as possible an account of the activities in which their work consists and the qualities necessary to their successful prosecution. As to the latter, the successful man will usually begin by telling the boy that the secret of his success was hard work. As a complete account of the matter, this is nonsense; it confuses an indispensable factor with the entire set of causes that produce the result. The student will, therefore, press his adviser to analyze his work and the powers it involves by means of a series of previously planned questions. The teacher can help his pupil greatly by co-operating in formulating questions. As a hint, take the following. As has been seen, we have not memory, but memories, and some of them may be strong and others weak. Now different occupations require different kinds of memories. Thus a certain clergyman obtained a very desirable parish through the discovery, after he had been

actively engaged in his profession a number of years, that he had a wonderful short range verbal memory, *i. e.*, that he could memorize his sermon just before delivering it in a comparatively short time and could then repeat it word for word without a moment's hesitation. He thereupon began to preach without notes, and this led to a call which he would otherwise not have received.

6. It can be treated, at least, as a means to the development of character and so, if we care anything about the possession of a strong, loyal will, it may derive an interest from what it gives us. But it can be made directly interesting by mixing the work with brains. This is well brought out in an article in the *World's Work*, Vol. X, p. 6324, *The Bookkeeper as a Human Being*. Bookkeeping is regarded by the majority of those who are engaged in it as one of the most uninteresting and monotonous of occupations, but the writer shows this need not be the cause. Among other things he says: "The ideal bookkeeper sees the meaning of the figures he sets down, sees the relation between his totals and the business—is, in short, a thinking human being. The fundamental charge against most bookkeepers is that they show no interest in their work." But this would not be true, he goes on to show, if they would take the trouble to study the significance of their entries. I know of a bookkeeper who took just this kind of an interest in his work, and he said he would have been glad, from sheer delight in the work itself, to keep the books of the great business house with which he was connected without money compensation, if he could have afforded it, and that had been the only condition upon which he was allowed to do it. This bookkeeper was not a slave, but a free man.


7. The teacher will present to the pupil some of the easily accessible literature which shows how farming has been transformed during the last generation from soulless drudgery into the exercise of an interesting art based upon scientific knowledge. The same is true of many parts of domestic service, especially the cooking. The skill that may be exercised in the management of even a small store or in running a trolley car will be easily discovered by the pupils themselves.


8. It is one thing to feel pain—and drudgery *qua* drudgery is painful; it is another thing to bear it easily or the reverse.

The second depends on one's emotional attitude toward it. Some are patient, others fret and fume, and thus make matters worse. These excrescences may be eliminated by determination and by habit. The motive for starting such a habit may be sheer insight into the necessity of so doing. A higher, and therefore more effective, motive is the discovery that one is in any event gaining something of the greatest value through the drudgery, namely, character. The normal boy dreams about being a hero. But the patient, uncomplaining submission to drudgery is the very highest form of heroism.

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